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ABSTRACT 
 
Dual-process models of attitudes distinguish between implicit and explicit processes in 
which the valence (i.e., positivity or negativity) of a stimulus influences judgments and 
behavior toward the stimulus. Developing parallel to the dual-process literature has been 
a threat detection literature suggesting that the mind is preferentially attuned to threats to 
immediate bodily harm. That literature reveals early privileged responses (e.g., shorter 
latency of detection, stronger reflexive reactions, and faster and stronger physiological 
responses) to threatening stimuli relative to negative, neutral, and positive stimuli. By 
integrating those literatures, I develop the Dual Implicit Process Model that postulates 
two functionally distinct and serially linked automatic processes in which an implicit 
threat process precedes (and potentially influences) an implicit valence process (positive 
vs. negative) which precedes (and potentially influences) explicit processes. In what 
follows, I review existing dual-process models of evaluation and a threat detection 
literature that developed parallel to (but in isolation of) the former. I then consider 
weaknesses of dual-process approach given the threat literature, but also limitations in the 
threat literature that preclude making strong claims about unique threat processing. I then 
describe three studies that overcome those limitations and introduce the Dual Implicit 
Process Model (DIPM), which integrates key aspects of both literatures. I subsequently 
offer two studies that apply the DIPM’s underlying dynamics to explore the basic 
mechanisms of implicit social cognition that often lead to prejudice. Finally, I close by 
discussing how the DIP may apply to certain other psychological phenomenon and 
discuss some open conceptual questions about the model.   
` 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction..................................................................................................... 1 
Dual-process Models of Evaluation ............................................................................. 2 
The Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants (MODE) Model ...................... 3 
The Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) Model ....................................... 5 
The Quad Model ..................................................................................................... 6 
Other Relevant Models ........................................................................................... 7 
Threat Processing ......................................................................................................... 9 
Limitation of the Dual Process Approach ................................................................. 13 
Limitations in Threat Research .................................................................................. 14 
Chapter 2 Evidence for Threat Processing as a Distinct Evaluative Process ............ 16 
Pilot Study ................................................................................................................. 16 
Study 1 ....................................................................................................................... 18 
Method .................................................................................................................. 19 
Results ................................................................................................................... 20 
Discussion ............................................................................................................. 21 
Study 2 ....................................................................................................................... 23 
Method .................................................................................................................. 23 
Results ................................................................................................................... 24 
Discussion ............................................................................................................. 26 
Study 3 ....................................................................................................................... 27 
Method .................................................................................................................. 29 
Results ................................................................................................................... 30 
Discussion ............................................................................................................. 32 
Chapter 2 General Discussion ................................................................................... 33 
Is the Threat Effect Driven by a Facet of Nonthreatening-Negativity? ................ 33 
Ontogeny versus Phylogeny ................................................................................. 35 
Morbid Fascination ............................................................................................... 36 
Implications of Threat Sensitivity for Evaluative Processing............................... 38 
Chapter 3 The Dual Implicit Process Model ................................................................ 40 
Inputs to i1 ............................................................................................................ 42 
Outputs of i1 ......................................................................................................... 42 
Magnitude of Outcomes Produced by i1 .............................................................. 44 
Putting it all Together ........................................................................................... 46 
Chapter 4 Prejudice from the Perspective of the DUal Implicit Process Model ....... 48 
Study 4 ....................................................................................................................... 51 
Methods................................................................................................................. 53 
Results ................................................................................................................... 54 
Discussion ............................................................................................................. 57 
Study 5 ....................................................................................................................... 59 
Pilot Study ............................................................................................................. 63 
Method .................................................................................................................. 64 
Data Preparation.................................................................................................... 66 
` 
vi 
 
Results ................................................................................................................... 73 
Discussion ............................................................................................................. 82 
Implications of the DIPM to Prejudice ...................................................................... 86 
Chapter 5 General Discussion, Open Conceptual Questions, and Implications for 
Other Lines of Research ................................................................................................. 90 
Implications of the DIPM .......................................................................................... 90 
Implications for Phobia ......................................................................................... 90 
Implications for Intimate Partner Violence........................................................... 93 
Implications for Suicide ........................................................................................ 94 
Open Questions .......................................................................................................... 96 
Summation of Successive i1 Events ..................................................................... 96 
Dual Implicit Processing in a Simple vs. Complex World ................................... 97 
Is i1 less Susceptible than i2 to Downregulation? ................................................ 98 
Individual Differences in i1 Processing .............................................................. 100 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 101 
References ...................................................................................................................... 103 
Appendix ........................................................................................................................ 126 
Stimuli from Studies 1-4 .......................................................................................... 127 
Mouse-Tracking Metrics ......................................................................................... 136 
Facial Stimuli from Study 5 ..................................................................................... 150 
Vita ................................................................................................................................. 158 
 
 
  
` 
vii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
  
Table 2.1. Mean ratings of good, bad, and threatening in final stimuli sets. .................... 18 
Table A.1. Mouse-tracking metrics of each Target x Distractor pairing by race of the face
................................................................................................................................. 149 
 
` 
viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 2.1. Mean visual search detection time. ................................................................ 22 
Figure 2.2. Percent of trials a stimulus in each pairing was gazed at first ........................ 26 
Figure 2.3. Mean standardized eye-blink amplitude as a function of image type ............ 32 
Figure 3.1. Diagram representation of the DIPM ............................................................. 41 
Figure 3.2. Threat potency and imminence determine magnitude of i1 response ............ 45 
Figure 4.1 Mean reaction times to respond to each Prime x Target pairing ..................... 56 
Figure 4.2. Sample trial from Study 5............................................................................... 66 
Figure 4.3. Visual representation of a trial response. ....................................................... 68 
Figure 4.4. (a) Actual estimated difference of Euclidean Distances. (b) Typical bacterial 
growth curve. ............................................................................................................ 70 
Figure 4.5. Maximum deviation location .......................................................................... 72 
Figure 4.6. Euclidean distance difference scores plotted across time for angry faces (and 
area-of-focus on lag time) as a function of Race and Distractor. ............................. 75 
Figure 4.7. Euclidean distance difference scores plotted across time for sad faces (and 
area-of-focus on lag time) as a function of Race and Distractor. ............................. 77 
Figure 4.8. Euclidean distance difference scores plotted across time for happy faces (and 
area-of-focus on lag time) as a function of Race and Distractor. ............................. 79 
Figure 4.9. Euclidean distance difference scores plotted across time for neutral faces (and 
area-of-focus on lag time) as a function of Race and Distractor. ............................. 81 
Figure 4.10. Area-of-focus on lag times of each race in every level of Target by 
Distractor. Note: White and Asian lines often overlap. ............................................ 84 
Figure 5.1. Magnitude of i1 response across time. ........................................................... 97 
Figure A.1 .Raw mouse-tracking paths. Note: All paths have been horizontally re-mapped 
to the left. X-axis: 0 = center of screen, 1 = left edge of screen. Y-axis: 0 = bottom 
of screen, 1.5 = top edge of screen. Asian and White lines often overlap. ............. 148 
 
 
` 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION1  
Imagine two experiences: (1) you were once terrorized by a knife-wielding 
funhouse clown and now automatically recoil whenever you see one; (2) you have a 
strong automatic dislike of mimes. Existing dual-process models of evaluation (e.g., 
Fazio & Olson, 2014; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011) conceptualize both as 
implicit negative evaluations and highlight the automatic properties of strong evaluation. 
I argue that the two reactions are the product of distinct evaluative processes, both of 
which can be activated quickly and without intention, yet have unique causes and 
consequences, and likely different analogues in the brain. I propose, in particular, that 
your reaction to the clown is the result of an implicit threat evaluation that is functionally 
distinguishable from an implicit negative evaluation responsible for your reaction to the 
mime. In what follows, I review existing dual-process models of evaluation and a threat 
detection literature that developed parallel to (but in isolation of) the former. I then 
consider weaknesses of dual-process approach given the threat literature, but also 
limitations in the threat literature that preclude making strong claims about unique threat 
processing. I then describe three studies that overcome those limitations and introduce the 
Dual Implicit Process Model (DIPM), which integrates key aspects of both literatures. I 
subsequently offer two studies that apply the DIPM’s underlying dynamics to explore the 
basic mechanisms of implicit social cognition that often lead to prejudice. Finally, I close 
                                                 
1 Much of Chapter 1 was previously published in March, D., Gaertner, L., & Olson M.A. (2018). On the prioritized 
processing of threat in a dual implicit process model of evaluation. Psychological Inquiry, 29, 1-13. 
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by discussing how the DIP may apply to certain other psychological phenomenon and 
discuss some open conceptual questions about the model.
Dual-process Models of Evaluation 
Dual-process models propose that evaluation occurs thorough both automatic (i.e.,  
implicit, spontaneous) and controlled (i.e., explicit, deliberate) processes. Automaticity 
implies that a process functions with at least one of the four characteristics of being 
unintentional, effortless, uncontrollable, or beyond awareness (Bargh, 1994; Greenwald 
& Banaji, 1995). In terms of latency, automatic processes are relatively fast and 
controlled processes are relatively slow. Such a dual-process framework has been applied 
quite broadly to account for a variety of psychological phenomena including attitude-
behavior correspondence (Fazio, 1990), attribution (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; 
Trope, 1986), decision making (Sloman, 1996), impression formation (Brewer, 1988; 
Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), persuasion (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and 
prejudice (Devine, 1989; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). A 
number of dual-process models of evaluation have been developed that differ in regard to 
operating principles (i.e., mechanisms by which stimuli are processed) and operating 
conditions (i.e., circumstances in which the mechanisms function). I describe the current 
state of several dual-process models with a focus on the aspects of each that are relevant 
to my argument that threat processing is distinct from other forms of automatic evaluative 
processing. 
 
 
` 
3 
 
The Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants (MODE) Model  
The Motivation and Opportunity as DEterminants (MODE) model (Fazio, 1990; 
Fazio & Olson, 2014) proposes that attitudes can be expressed in judgments and behavior 
through spontaneous and/or deliberative processes. From the perspective of the MODE 
model, the starting point for evaluative responding is whether an attitude of sufficient 
strength is activated automatically upon perception of an attitude object. Spontaneous 
processing occurs automatically, without intention, and can influence downstream 
judgments and behavior. Deliberative processing occurs downstream, is effortful, and 
may attempt to steer judgments and behaviors away from the implications of 
spontaneously activated evaluations given ample motivation and opportunity to do so. 
But, if the spontaneously activated evaluation is sufficiently strong, it can bias initial 
stages of processing that have downstream consequences on deliberative perceptions, 
judgments, behaviors – in terms of guiding attention toward the object (Roskos-Ewoldsen 
& Fazio, 1992) and construal of it (Smith, Fazio, & Cejka, 1996). Motivation and 
opportunity together determine whether the expressed judgment or behavior mainly 
reflects spontaneous and/or deliberate processing. Motivation refers to the desire to 
engage in deliberative processing, whether in a general pursuit of accuracy, or in pursuit 
of a specific conclusion (e.g., to avoid prejudice). Opportunity refers to the capacity in a 
given situation to engage in deliberative processing; some situations, like those requiring 
fast reactions, limit the capacity to deliberatively control responses. Similarly, fatigue, 
intoxication, and other factors that limit cognitive capacity also limit opportunity. In the 
absence of motivation or opportunity, the spontaneous evaluation of the object in 
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question is the main determinant of judgments and behavior. With both motivation and 
opportunity present, evaluative judgments and behaviors are more likely to reflect 
deliberately held motives rather than automatically-activated attitudes.  
For instance, imagine a chocolate-lover encountering a chocolate bar. A strong 
positive preexisting attitude toward chocolate would lead one to automatically categorize 
a chocolate bar as something delicious to consume. If the chocolate-lover, however, were 
on a diet (motivated to avoid empty calories) and fully rested and sober (able to 
contemplate calories), the chocolate-lover would likely abstain. On the other hand, if the 
dieting chocolate-lover were hungry, intoxicated, or stressed, (i.e., a compromised 
capacity to think), the spontaneously positive evaluation would likely lead to 
consumption of the chocolate.  
For the present purposes, it is important to note that the MODE model considers 
automaticity of the attitude along a continuum defined only by an object-evaluation 
association, that is, the association in memory between an object and its summary 
evaluation. It does not consider other factors that might determine spontaneity of 
activation. Regardless of the nature of the object, attitudes characterized by stronger 
object-evaluation associations are more likely to have such properties of automaticity as 
spontaneous activation of the evaluation in response to perceiving the object, attitude-
consistent construal of the object, and spontaneous approach/avoidance behavior toward 
the object.  
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The Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) Model 
The Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006; 2007) is focused on operating principles (i.e., characteristics of the 
mechanism operating) in contrast to the MODE model’s focus on operating conditions 
(i.e., when a mechanism is operating). The APE model argues that evaluation manifests 
through associative and propositional processes, with the former generally being 
automatic and the latter being controlled (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2009, 2014). The 
associative process links objects and events through contiguity (i.e., environmental or 
spatiotemporal co-occurrence; e.g., evaluative conditioning; Jones, Olson, & Fazio, 
2010). The activation of associative processes occurs via feature similarity (e.g., “that 
looks like chocolate”) and is experienced as automatic affect. Propositional reasoning is 
more effortful and includes truth/falsehood tags by weighing the validity of the activated 
associations using both preexisting information and contextual cues.  
Because associative and propositional processes glean information from different 
sources, they may not always agree. Whatever “momentarily considered” propositions 
are activated in response to the associative input determines whether those associations 
are accepted or rejected. Such acceptance or rejection depends on principles of cognitive 
consistency. For example, if the proposition is congruent with the activated association, 
the associative evaluation will likely influence evaluative judgments. But, if propositional 
reasoning diverges from the associative evaluation, the association is rejected as a basis 
for evaluative judgments (and possibly behavior). Because propositional (i.e., correction) 
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processing occurs last, it is the operation most vulnerable to constraints on attention, 
time, or cognitive resources (analogous to the “opportunity” factor of the MODE model). 
Continuing the chocolate example, chocolate is often portrayed as delicious, and 
repeated co-occurrence of chocolate and delicious would yield an associatively formed 
positive evaluation of chocolate. Yet, a chocolate-loving-dieter’s positive automatic 
associative response to chocolate is inconsistent with the momentarily considered 
propositional belief that chocolate is high in calories. Similar to MODE model logic, 
whether propositional reasoning overrules the associative link between chocolate and 
delicious is influenced by operating conditions. If one has both motivation (e.g., to lose 
weight) and opportunity, the propositional concern with weight gain (e.g., “I believe that 
eating that delicious chocolate would be inconsistent with my weight loss goals”) would 
override the positive associations activated in response to the chocolate. Lacking either 
(e.g., if starving or intoxicated) would likely lead to judgments reflecting the initial 
association.  
Like the MODE model, the APE model does not make distinctions about the 
nature of the evaluative associations that produce automatic evaluative responses. All that 
matters are their associative strength.  
The Quad Model 
The Quad model distinguishes between four processes of evaluation that involve 
the automatic vs. controlled distinction: Activation, Guessing, Discrimination, and 
Overcoming Bias (Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005). The 
Activation (AC) process activates existing evaluative associations in response to objects 
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encountered in the environment. The Guessing (G) process drives responses in the 
absence of other information, often resulting in response biases (i.e., a default response 
tendency in a given context, such as to respond with approach rather than avoidance). 
The Discrimination (D) process uses explicit information from previous experience or the 
environment to determine possible outcomes, and the Overcoming Bias (OB) process 
monitors for the appropriate response and attempts to suppress automatically activated 
evaluative associations or response tendencies. These processes are not purely automatic 
or controlled. While AC and G usually function automatically, G can function more 
deliberatively. Conversely, while D and OB usually function deliberatively, they can 
acquire automatic features.  
  For instance, imagine a chocolate-lover receives what appears to be chocolate, but 
it is actually the terrible tasting chocolate substitute, carob. A preexisting positive 
automatic evaluation of chocolate is activated (AC) because the chocolate lover’s default 
response toward anything resembling chocolate is to assume (G) that it is indeed 
chocolate. But, having been tricked into eating carob in the recent past, the perceiver is 
motivated to overcome the initial bias (OB) in order to ensure that they discriminate (D) 
what the candy bar actually is, delicious chocolate or terrible carob, before eating it.  
Like the above models the QUAD model is agnostic regarding what sorts of 
objects might become associated with automatic evaluation. It does not make distinctions 
about the nature of the associations within the AC and G processes. 
Other Relevant Models 
Dual-attitudes models (e.g., Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) propose that 
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attitudes can form both implicitly and explicitly toward the same object and co-exist as 
distinct mental entities. This implies the possibility of evaluative dissociation, with the 
implicit attitude and explicit attitudes having opposite valence. 
Dual-system models locate automatic and controlled processes, or what these 
models refer to as reflexive vs. reflective (Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002) or 
intuitive vs. rule-based (Sloman, 1996/2014), in distinct mental systems with unique 
neural substrates. As with dual-attitudes models, these dual-systems approaches suggest 
that the automatic and controlled processes can yield distinct attitudes of opposite valence 
(McConnell & Rydell, 2014). Downstream reflective (rule-based) processing may inhibit 
the reflexive (intuitive) system similarly to the MODE model.  
Resuming the chocolate example, upon an initial enjoyable exposure to chocolate 
the automatic/intuitive/reflexive system may form a positive attitude toward chocolate. 
After learning about the high caloric content of chocolate, the controlled/rule-
based/reflective system forms a second negative evaluation. Dual-attitudes and dual-
systems models agree that the positive implicit attitude and negative explicit attitude now 
coexist; but dual-attitudes models assume one system is responsible for both evaluations, 
while dual-systems models place each evaluation within the confines of a unique system. 
Whether the automatic positive evaluation of chocolate is constrained by the controlled 
system is again dependent on the MODE model’s operating conditions (i.e., motivation 
and opportunity). 
In summary, a number of dual-process models of evaluation have been proposed. 
They differ in detail but share the common distinction between automatic and controlled 
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evaluative processing. And they do not make functional distinctions between different 
kinds of automatic or implicit evaluative processing. As I discuss in subsequent sections, 
this is a limitation that the literature on threat processing brings to light. 
Threat Processing 
 Threat is a broadly employed concept in psychological research, such as threat to 
identity (Steele, 1997), ingroup status and resources (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), and self-
esteem (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996). Anchored in an evolutionary framework, 
the threat (i.e., fear) processing literature has focused exclusively on threats to immediate 
bodily harm, which is my focus here. Ancestors who reacted more quickly when 
confronted with such threats were more likely to survive than were their slower 
conspecifics (Blanchette, 2006), which is likely why humans overestimate the threat-
relevance of stimuli in ambiguous situations (Haselton & Buss, 2000; Nesse, 2005). A 
psychology of threat perception ostensibly evolved as an adaptive mechanism for the 
rapid avoidance of physical danger (e.g., Schaller & Neuberg, 2012).  
Öhman makes the case for such an adaption in the form of a hypothetical “fear 
module” responsible for processing and initiating reaction to threat (Öhman & Mineka, 
2001, 2003). Such processing ostensibly utilizes neural circuitry that evolved prior to the 
cortices, enabling it to function semi-independently of (i.e., in parallel to) non-threat-
relevant mental processes (Calder, Lawrence, & Young, 2001). Consistent with such a 
possibility is what LeDoux (1996, 2012) refers to as the “low-road,” a subcortical 
pathway to the amygdala capable of detecting threat and activating associated responses 
without explicit processing (in contrast to the “high road,” which is slower but provides 
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more processed – i.e., cortical – information). Such a low road allows for rapid responses 
after only superficial processing of the stimuli, while the high road undertakes more 
comprehensive processing before instigating a response (Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 
1999). 
Although the amygdala is involved in the general processing of affective and 
motivationally relevant information (including novel and extremely positive stimuli; 
Cunningham & Brosch, 2012), it is particularly attuned to the initial processing of 
threatening information (Campeu et al., 1991; Cunningham, Packer, Kesek, & van Bavel, 
2009; Lewis, Critchley, Rotshtein, & Dolan, 2007; Pascoe & Kapp, 1985). The amygdala 
may thus initiate responses to stimuli and activate associated processes before neocortical 
structures have received, interpreted, and responded to the same information. 
Neuroanatomical research of the human brain supports such a “low road” capable of 
detecting and evaluating emotionally salient information and initiating responses without 
explicit awareness (Garvert, Friston, Dolan, & Garrido, 2014; Garrido, Barnes, Sahani, & 
Dolan, 2012; Whalen et al., 2004; cf. Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010).  
As I will review, research is consistent with the possibility that humans inherited 
an ability to preferentially process threats to immediate survival – an effect that has been 
dubbed the threat-superiority effect (Blanchette, 2006; Fox & Damjanovic, 2006). 
Stimuli such as lions, snakes, sharks, and weapons pose an imminent threat to survival 
and necessitate quick detection and avoidance. Clearly, such threatening stimuli are 
negative. But, not all negative stimuli are threatening. Importantly, the existing research 
indicates that the mind preferentially processes threatening stimuli, not simply negative 
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stimuli – this is a point to which I will return. Furthermore, the preferential response to 
threatening stimuli relative to negative, neutral, and positive stimuli occurs in terms of 
very early responses, such as shorter latency of detection, stronger reflexive reactions, 
and faster and stronger physiological responses, all of which underlie the presumed 
adaptive value of quickly detecting and reacting to survival threats.  
Consistent with the possibility that threatening stimuli are preferentially processed 
is research indicating that people more quickly detect threatening stimuli (e.g., snake, 
spider, gun, knife) than innocuous stimuli (e.g., flowers, mushrooms; Blanchette, 2006; 
Brosch & Sharma, 2005; Fox, Griggs, & Mouchlianitis, 2007; Ӧhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 
2001) and are quicker to detect angry faces than happy or sad faces (Eastwood, Smilek, 
& Merikle, 2001; Fox et al., 2007; Ӧhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001). Eye-tracking 
research has shown that initial attention is more frequently drawn to threatening images 
than to positive or neutral images (Hermans, Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 1999; Rinck & 
Becker, 2006). Research using continuous flash suppression (which prevents awareness 
of stimuli for multiple seconds) suggests that misattribution of affect occurs for angry but 
not happy faces (Almeida, Pajtas, Mahon, Nakayama, & Caramazza, 2013) and threat-
relevant faces emerge from suppression and into consciousness more quickly than do 
neutral or happy faces (Yang, Zald, & Blake, 2007). 
Similarly, research suggests that both supraliminally and subliminally presented 
threatening stimuli elicit unique physiological responses (Knight, Waters, & Bandettini, 
2009; Morris et al., 1999; Whalen et al., 1998). For example, subliminally presented 
angry faces increase skin conductance responses while happy faces do not (Esteves, 
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Dimberg, & Öhman, 1994), subliminally presented fearful faces increase amygdala 
activity relative to happy faces (Whalen et al., 1998), and classical conditioning occurs to 
subliminal angry but not happy faces (Esteves, Parra, Dimberg, & Öhman, 1994). Also, 
participants conditioned to supraliminal angry faces continue to show evidence of 
conditioning (i.e., increased skin conductance) after the aversive shock is removed (i.e., 
during extinction), but show no lingering conditioning to happy or neutral faces 
(Dimberg & Öhman, 1996). Supraliminally presented directly-threatening stimuli elicit 
stronger and faster amygdala responses than do other types of negative stimuli (Kveraga 
et al., 2015) and supraliminally presented threatening stimuli elicit earlier cortical activity 
than do other types of negative and positive stimuli (Costa et al., 2014). The amygdala 
also shows more activity to subliminally presented fearful than neutral faces independent 
of fusiform facial area activity, suggesting such activation is independent of attention 
(Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001) 
Although non-diagnostic of a threat versus negative difference, similar patterns 
are reported in studies that collapsed across threatening stimuli (e.g., guns) and 
nonthreatening-negative stimuli (e.g., attributes such as rude). People, for example, are 
better able to identify the presence and categorize the valence of subliminally presented 
threatening/negative words than neutral or positive words (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003). 
Subliminally presented threatening/negative but not positive stimuli potentiate startle-
eyeblinks relative to neutral stimuli (Reagh & Knight, 2013) and event-related brain 
potentials are larger during evaluative categorization of supraliminally presented 
threatening/negative stimuli than positive or neutral stimuli (Ito, Larsen, Smith, & 
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Cacioppo, 1998). When attention is distracted from the emotional content of stimuli, 
amygdala activity is heightened in response to threatening/negative stimuli relative to 
positive and neutral stimuli (Straube, Pohlack, Mentzel, & Miltner, 2008).  
Hence the threat-processing literature yields robust evidence of a threat-
superiority effect that manifests as faster and stronger perceptual, physiological, and 
behavioral reactions to stimuli that pose an immediate survival threat. Importantly, this 
preferential processing occurs in regard to early reactions and does not imply that it 
occurs at a longer or more protracted time course. Indeed, the functional utility of the 
effect is ostensibly rooted in the survival value of avoiding imminent danger. Notably, 
this early preferential processing of threat carries an interesting and important implication 
for dual-process models of evaluation.  
Limitation of the Dual Process Approach 
Recall how earlier I discussed several dual-process models that each describe 
separate implicit and explicit processes. These perspectives are valuable for 
understanding the differences between and interplay of implicit versus explicit evaluation 
and have established those processes as being serial in nature. Implicit processing is 
associative, intuitive, and reflexive, and as such it is fast and efficient. Explicit processing 
is controlled, propositional, deliberative, and reflective, and as such it is slow, effortful, 
and downstream of implicit processing. In terms of dual-process models, the fast and 
early responses of the threat-superiority effect constitute an implicit response. Existing 
dual-process models, however, cannot explain or account for threat superiority. From the 
perspective of these models, the automaticity of an implicit response is thought to occur 
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equally for positively and negatively evaluated stimuli. The MODE model for example, 
conceptualizes automaticity of evaluative responses solely in terms of the strength of the 
object-evaluation association, and does not qualify that tenant in terms of valence or 
threat potential. Similarly, the APE model discusses activated associations between 
objects and affect without specifying further the nature of those associations. In short, 
these models do not articulate a speed or strength difference between evaluations of 
different valences. The threat literature, on the other hand, indicates a qualitative 
distinction in implicit processing that existing dual-process models do not capture. 
Threatening stimuli are evaluated negatively, just as are nonthreatening-negative stimuli, 
but threatening stimuli systematically elicit faster and stronger responses than do other 
negative or positive stimuli. Here the mind is not queued just to valence, it is particularly 
queued to threat. When juxtaposed with dual-process models, the threat literature implies 
the possibility of two serially linked implicit processes. One implicit process, evaluative 
threat processing, is attuned to survival threats such that objects are evaluated implicitly 
as to whether they pose an immediate survival threat. The other implicit processes, 
evaluative valence processing, is attuned to valence such that objects are evaluated 
implicitly as to whether they are good or bad. In the model I develop below, I do 
articulate such a distinction in an integrated model. 
Limitations in Threat Research 
Although extant research implies that threat receives preferential responding, 
methodological limitations prevent a firm conclusion and allow the possibility that 
negativity, not threat per se, is the trigger. Some studies precluded a direct test by 
` 
15 
 
assessing reactions to threatening stimuli without additionally assessing reactions to 
nonthreatening-negative stimuli (e.g., Esteves et al., 1994; Ӧhman, Flykt, et al., 2001). 
Other studies, as noted above, confounded threatening and nonthreatening-negative 
stimuli by combining them in a single stimulus set (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003; Ito, 
Cacioppo, & Lang, 1998; Reagh & Knight, 2013). One study directly compared 
threatening stimuli (i.e., angry face) versus nonthreatening-negative stimuli (i.e., sad face; 
Ӧhman, et al., 2001), but as the authors acknowledged, the threatening stimuli were rated 
as more negative than the nonthreatening-negative stimuli, leaving the possibility that 
responses were driven by negativity, not threat. Only Kveraga et al. (2015) and Costa et 
al. (2014) operationally distinguished threatening from nonthreatening-negative stimuli. 
Though they found differential brain activity, they did not assess different attentional and 
behavioral responses to threatening versus nonthreatening-negative stimuli, which should 
occur if sensitivity to threat functions for survival. In the next section, I provide such a 
test whereby I examine differential behavioral and physiological responses to threat and 
nonthreatening negative stimuli.  
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CHAPTER 22 
EVIDENCE FOR THREAT PROCESSING AS A DISTINCT 
EVALUATIVE PROCESS  
 
In the current chapter, I provide a missing critical test as to whether threatening 
versus merely all negative stimuli elicit preferential responses. I established with pilot 
testing distinct sets of threatening, nonthreatening-negative, positive, and neutral stimuli
and conducted three studies. Each study used a different paradigm to test whether the 
mind responds preferentially to threatening stimuli. Study 1 used visual search to test 
whether threatening stimuli are detected more quickly than nonthreatening-negative 
stimuli. Study 2 used eye-tracking to test whether initial attention is biased to threatening 
stimuli than other stimuli. Study 3 used startle-eyeblink to test whether threatening-
stimuli elicit a stronger reflexive response than do other stimuli. 
Pilot Study 
 I conducted a pilot study to obtain stimuli that are experienced as threatening, 
nonthreatening-negative, positive, or neutral, respectively. I collected 400 images from 
public sources on the Internet, the International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, 
& Cuthbert, 2008), the Bank of Standardized Stimuli (Brodeur, Dionne-Dostie, 
Montreuil, & Lepage, 2010), and images provided to me from Kveraga et al. (2015). I 
scaled all images to 500 x 500-pixels. 
                                                 
2 Much of Chapter 2 was previously published in March, D., Gaertner, L., & Olson M.A. (2017). In harm’s way: On 
preferential response to threatening stimuli. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 11, 1519-1529. 
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 One hundred and forty-nine undergraduates participated for partial credit in 
introductory psychology. Seated in computer cubicles, they rated 400 images (presented 
in a random order) on one of three randomly assigned dimensions of how good (n = 50), 
bad (n = 51), or threatening (n = 48) they deemed each image (1 = “Not at All” to 7 = 
“Extremely”).  I computed each image’s mean rating of good, bad, and threatening, and, 
based on those ratings, assigned each image to one of four categories: positive, neutral, 
nonthreatening-negative, or threating. Positive category images (n = 94) had bad and 
threat ratings less than 2 and good ratings greater than 5. Neutral category images (n = 
92) had bad and threat ratings less than 2 and good ratings less than 5. Nonthreatening-
negative category images (n = 77) had good ratings less than 3, bad ratings greater than 3, 
and threat ratings less than 4. Threat category images (n = 92) had good ratings less 
than3, bad ratings greater than 3, and threat ratings greater than 4 (see Table 2.1).  
I eliminated 45 images that could not be categorized and eliminated categorized 
images that were (a) rendered ambiguous when scaled to 300 x 300-pixels (which was 
necessary for Study 1), (b) natively too bright or dark to equate luminance across sets, or 
(c), could shift categories based on context (e.g., a plant could shift from neutral to 
positive if co-occurring with other positive stimuli). This yielded a final set in which the 
four categories were equated on luminance and red value and contained 40 images each. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
` 
 
18 
 
Table 2.1. Mean ratings of good, bad, and threatening in final stimuli sets. 
 
 
The non-threatening-negative category consisted of stimuli that are unpleasant but 
do not pose an immediate survival threat (e.g., rotten teeth, excrement, sick or dead 
animals, maggots). Importantly, both the threatening and non-threatening-negative 
stimuli were evaluated as negative, but only the former were evaluated as highly 
threatening. All four categories were equivalent in red value and luminance. I 
subsequently employed these stimuli in the next three studies (see Appendix for all 
images). 
Study 1 
 I employed a visual search paradigm (e.g., Ӧhman Flykt, et al., 2001; Ӧhman, 
Lundqvist, et al., 2001) to test whether threatening stimuli are detected faster than 
nonthreatening-negative stimuli. I compared the speed with which participants could 
detect a threatening stimulus embedded among all positive or neutral stimuli versus a 
nonthreatening-negative stimulus embedded among the same array of positive or neutral 
stimuli.  
 
 Rating Type: Mean (SD)b 
Image Seta Good Bad Threatening 
Positive 6.14 (0.76) 1.07 (0.18) 1.09 (0.11) 
Negative 1.53 (0.47) 4.78 (1.14) 3.18 (1.31) 
Threatening 2.02 (0.86) 4.40 (1.54) 5.73 (0.99) 
aEach set contains 40 images. 
bRating type varied between-subjects (scale: “1 = Not at All” to “7 = Extremely”). 
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Method 
One hundred and seven undergraduates (69 female, 38 male) participated for 
partial credit in introductory psychology. Participants sat in individual computer cubicles 
containing a 48cm high speed, high-resolution monitor and computer. Instructions 
explained that the study examined attention and rapid responding and that the participant 
would be presented with several trials consisting of a 3 x 3 grid of eight 300 x 300-pixel 
images surrounding a fixation point “X” in the center cell. Participants were informed 
that the grid would consist of pictures that were good, bad, or neutral, and that on some 
trials all eight images would be of the same type (i.e., all good, all bad, or all neutral) and 
on other trials seven of the images would be of one type and one image would be of a 
different type (see Supplemental Figure 1 for an example). Their task was to indicate 
whether the images were all of the “same” type by pressing the Z-key or whether one of 
the images was of a “different” type by pressing the /-key. Each trial was heralded by a 
1000ms center-screen fixation point (“X”), after which the grid appeared and remained 
until participants responded. A variable 2000-6000ms blank screen separated each trial. 
 Participants completed 384 trials divided into four blocks of 96 trials, with a one-
minute rest between blocks. Each block consisted of 48 congruent trials and 48 
incongruent trials. Congruent trials were balanced across the four category sets. Critical 
incongruent trials within a block consisted of six trials each of one threatening image 
embedded among seven positive, one threatening image embedded among seven neutral, 
one nonthreatening-negative image embedded among seven positive, and one 
nonthreatening-negative image embedded among seven neutral. To ensure that the 
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presence of threatening or nonthreatening-negative images did not serve as a cue that the 
stimuli were “different,” each block also included non-critical incongruent trials that 
consisted of six trials each of one positive image embedded among seven threatening, one 
neutral image embedded among seven threatening, one positive image embedded among 
seven nonthreatening-negative, and one neutral image embedded among seven 
nonthreatening-negative. Hence, positive, neutral, nonthreatening-negative, and 
threatening images were equally likely to occur on congruent and incongruent trials and 
the order of congruent and incongruent trials was randomized. The image that populated 
each space in the matrix was fully randomized and all images from each respective 
category were presented before any image reoccurred. No effects were moderated by 
block; hence this variable is not discussed further. Upon completion of the task, 
participants were debriefed, thanked, and send on their way. 
Results 
 I excluded the responses of 15 participants due to a power outage that prematurely 
ended the session (n = 2), a fire alarm during the session (n = 4), or excessive error rates 
(> 25%) on incongruent trials (n = 9), which yielded a sample of 92 participants (55 
female, 37 male). I retained reaction times (RTs) to incongruent trials, excluded RTs for 
incorrect responses (9.3%), natural-log transformed RTs to adjust for excessive positive 
skew, and excluded transformed RTs that were 3SD above (0.68%) or below (0.43%) the 
mean RT. I report the results of inferential tests based on transformed data, and report 
descriptive statistics based on raw reaction times. I computed for each participant mean 
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RTs to the threatening and nonthreatening-negative targets embedded among the positive 
and neutral distractors.  
 I submitted RTs to a 2 (Target: threatening, nonthreatening-negative) x 2 
(Distractor: positive, neutral) repeated measures ANOVA. A main effect of distractor, 
F(1,92) = 60.24, p = .0001, indicated that participants were faster to detect a discrepancy 
embedded among neutral (M = 2060.40ms, SD = 560.34) than positive distractors (M = 
2226.93, SD = 587.86). More importantly, a main effect of target, F(1,92) = 61.28, p = 
.0001, η2 = .39, indicated that participants were faster to detect threatening (M = 
2072.55ms, SD = 575.25) than nonthreatening-negative stimuli (M = 2214.84ms, SD = 
576.56). This pattern was consistent across distractors as indicated by the absence of a 
Target x Distractor interaction, F(1,92) = .06, p = .8019 (see Figure 2.1).  
Discussion 
Using empirically validated stimuli, the visual search paradigm indicated that 
people more quickly detect a discrepant image when it is threatening than 
nonthreatening-negative. Although these data are consistent with the possibility that 
threat is found more quickly (Itti, Koch, & Niebur, 1998), the visual search paradigm has 
two limitations. Because the task requires participants to detect the discrepant stimulus 
and press a key signaling stimulus detection, it is possible that participants were equally 
likely to detect the threatening and nonthreatening-negative stimuli but were slower to 
disengage from the nonthreatening-negative stimuli and press the key (West, Anderson, 
& Pratt, 2009). Also, the processing of threatening and nonthreatening-negative stimuli 
was never placed in direct competition because those stimuli did not co-occur on a given 
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trial. Consequently, I employ a paradigm in Study 2 that overcomes both limitations to 
test whether threatening stimuli preferentially capture reflexive attention.  
 I presented participants with pairings of all four stimulus-types (e.g., a threatening 
image paired with a nonthreatening-negative image) and used an eye-tracker to assess the 
stimulus in each pair at which participants first gazed (Rayner, 1978). Because the 
orienting of attention in the visual field is influenced by processing goals (West et al., 
2009), I created critical trials that lacked any explicit goal other than attending to the 
screen. If threat preferentially captures attention, initial gaze should be drawn more 
frequently to threatening stimuli.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Mean visual search detection time.  
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Study 2 
Method 
 Eighty-nine undergraduates (39 females, 50 males) participated for partial credit 
in introductory psychology. Participants sat in a computer cubicle ~60cm from a 60cm 
high speed, high-resolution monitor. Eye movements were recorded by a Gazepoint GP3 
tracker (Gazepoint Research Inc., Vancouver, Canada) mounted below the monitor 
sampling at 60Hz and captured using iMotions Biometric Research Platform (iMotions 
Inc., Botson, MA). A 9-point calibration was administered to ensure accurate eye-
tracking (12 participants who failed to track were dismissed without completing the 
remaining procedure). 
Instructions informed participants that the study examined the perception of 
motion and they would complete two tasks. For the first task, they would see a grey ball 
appear in the middle of the screen, move around, return to the middle, and be replaced 
with two still images, one to the left and one to the right of where the ball was. 
Participants were instructed to follow the ball with their eyes until it disappeared and 
simply look at the screen when the images appeared. For the second task (which never 
occurred), participants were told the ball would move around in front of the still images – 
this offered an explanation as to why there were image pairs without providing an explicit 
goal as to what to do with the images other than look at the screen. 
Participants then completed 96 trials. Each trial began with a centrally located 
2cm grey ball that moved randomly around the screen for 4 s before returning to the 
center (ensuring eye-gaze was centrally fixated) and disappearing, at which point a pair 
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of 500 x 500-pixel images appeared for 4s. There were six types of image pairs from my 
four stimulus categories. Specifically, there were 16 trials each of threat with 
nonthreatening-negative, threat with positive, threat with neutral, nonthreatening-negative 
with positive, nonthreatening-negative with neutral, and positive with neutral. Images 
were left-right counterbalanced such that each stimulus type within a pair appeared an 
equal number of times on the left and right side of the screen. The image that populated 
the left or right side of the screen was fully randomized and all images from each 
respective category were presented before any image reoccurred. Participants 
subsequently completed the disgust sensitivity scale (α = 86; Olatunji et al., 2007), which 
did not moderate initial eye gaze, and were thanked and debriefed.  
Results  
Of the 77 participants whose eyes tracked, fourteen yielded unusable data due to 
software malfunction (n = 10) or experimenter error (n = 4), which yielded a sample of 
63 (29 females, 34 males) participants with a total of 6,048 trials. I excluded 1,486 
(24.57%) unusable trials because (a) less than 80% of the trial tracked (n = 768, 12.70%), 
(b) the trial began with the participant gazing where one of the two stimuli would appear 
rather than centrally fixating (n = 700, 11.57%), or (c) the participant gazed at neither 
stimulus during the trial (n = 18, 0.30%); thereby yielding 4,562 usable trials. 
Latency to the stimulus in a given pair to which participants first gazed did not 
vary across the six pair-types (median = 461ms). To test for an attentional bias toward the 
stimulus in each pair to which participants first gazed, I conducted a multilevel logistic 
regression using PROC GLIMMIX of SAS with a random intercept to control for the 
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nested trial-by-trial gazes within participants. Initial attention was more likely to be 
drawn to threatening stimuli than to any other stimulus type (see Figure 2.2). Participants 
first gazed at the threatening stimulus on 62% of trials when paired with a 
nonthreatening-negative stimulus, b = 0.47, 95% CI [0.32, 0.62], t(4527) = 6.05, p = 
.0001, 63% of trials when paired with a positive stimulus, b = 0.55, 95% CI [0.40, 0.70], 
t(4527) = 7.02, p = .0001, and 68% of trials when paired with a neutral stimulus, b = 
0.74, 95% CI [0.58, 0.90], t(4527) = 9.16, p = .0001.  
For pairs that did not involve a threating stimulus, initial attention was more likely 
to be drawn to nonthreatening-negative than to positive or neutral stimuli. In particular, 
participants first gazed at the nonthreatening-negative stimulus on 54% of trials when 
paired with a positive stimulus, b = 0.17, 95% CI [0.02, 0.31], t(4527) = 2.18, p = .0292 
and 62% of trials when paired with a neutral stimulus, b = 0.50, 95% CI [0.35, 0.65], 
t(4527) = 6.35, p = .0001. Finally, initial attention was more likely to be drawn to 
positive than neutral stimuli with participants first gazing at the positive stimulus on 60% 
of trials when paired with a neutral stimulus, b = 0.41, 95% CI [0.26, 0.56], t(4527) = 
5.24, p = .0001. 
Furthermore, the tendency to first gaze at the threatening stimulus paired with a 
neutral or positive stimulus was stronger than the corresponding tendency to first gaze at 
the nonthreatening-negative stimulus. In particular, the odds of first gaze were 1.28 
higher for the threatening than nonthreatening-negative stimulus when each was paired 
with a neutral stimulus, t(4527) = 2.26, p = .0238, and 1.47 higher for the threatening 
than nonthreatening-negative stimulus when each was paired with a positive stimulus,  
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Figure 2.2. Percent of trials a stimulus in each pairing was gazed at first 
 
 
 
t(4527) = 3.70, p = .0002. Similarly, the odds of a first gaze were 1.40 higher for the 
threatening than positive stimulus when each was paired with a neutral stimulus, t(4527) 
= 3.11, p = .0019.  
Discussion 
Using empirically validated stimuli, the eye-tracking paradigm indicated that 
initial attention (i.e., first gaze) was most strongly drawn to threatening stimuli. 
Participants were more likely to gaze first at a threatening stimulus when it was paired 
with either a nonthreatening-negative, positive, or neutral stimulus. Furthermore, when 
paired with a positive or neutral stimulus, threatening stimuli drew first gaze more 
frequently than did a corresponding nonthreatening-negative stimulus and the head to 
head pairing of threat and nonthreatening-negative directly revealed the greater attention 
capturing power of threat than that of nonthreatening-negativity. These patterns 
conceptually replicate and extend the findings from Study 1 and together suggest that 
threat elicits preferential response. In Study 3, I turn to a physiological paradigm to test 
whether threatening stimuli elicit uncontrolled responses more strongly than do other 
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stimuli. In particular, I examine a response that directly captures the presumed reflexive 
nature of threat processing, namely, the startle-eyeblink (Guglielmi, 1999). 
Study 3 
The startle-eyeblink paradigm utilizes a noise-blast (i.e., startle probe) to induce a 
blink during stimulus processing. Facial electromyography (fEMG) measures blink 
amplitude by recording electrical potential generated by the orbicularis oculi muscle 
responsible for closing the eye (Grillon, Pellowski, Marikangas, & Davis, 1997; Lang et 
al., 1990). The eyeblink reflex is characterized by rapid contraction of the orbicularis 
oculi, causing a blink 30-50ms after onset of a startle probe. Projections from the 
amygdala directly to the nucleus reticularis pontis caudalis (sensorimotor interface, 
located in caudal pons) influence potentiation of the startle-eyeblink reflex (Davis, 1992; 
Hitchcock & Davis, 1991). Evaluative information from the amygdala is carried to these 
brain regions, which in turn modulates startle responses (Rosen et al., 1991). As an index 
of amygdala activation (i.e., underlying autonomic activation of unique evaluations), the 
startle response distinguishes reactions to different classes of stimuli (Amodio, Harmon-
Jones, & Devine, 2003; Robinson & Vrana, 2000). This paradigm is especially 
appropriate to my current goal given the amygdalar role in processing information related 
to motivationally relevant stimuli (Davis, 1992).  
The startle method has been used to discriminate responses to various types of 
stimuli (for review see Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1999). Eyeblink responses are a 
combination of affective modulation and attentional interest effects (Filion, et al., 1998; 
Vanman, Ryan, Pedersen, & Ito, 2013). Affective modulation reflects biphasic evaluation 
` 
 
28 
 
leading to either negative (aversive) action dispositions and startle potentiation, or 
positive (appetitive) action disposition and no startle potentiation. Alternatively, the 
attentional resource framework holds that startle amplitude decreases as relative interest 
increases. However, these effects often co-occur; for instance, startle responses to 
negative objects can involve both an interest and aversive response. Negative stimuli, 
being evaluatively congruent with the aversive noise-blast, enhance startle responses 
(Lang et al., 1990), effectively overwhelming inhibition from interest. People, for 
example, manifest larger startle-eyeblinks when viewing negative stimuli relative to 
positive or neutral stimuli at long lead intervals (i.e., when the startle probe is 
administered >1s after prime onset; Amodio et al., 2003; March & Graham, 2015; Vrana, 
Spence, & Lang, 1988; for review see Filion, Dawson, & Schell, 1998), even though 
interest in these stimuli is high. (Though it should be noted that these negative stimuli 
confounded threat and negativity.) Conversely, positive stimuli are evaluatively 
incongruent with the subsequent probe, and because only attention is influencing startle 
responses absent aversion, the startle reflex is inhibited (Filion, et al., 1998; Vanman et 
al., 2013). People therefore exhibit weaker startle-eyeblinks when viewing positive 
relative to negative or neutral stimuli at long lead intervals (Dillon & LaBar, 2005). 
Although it has been suggested that startle-eyeblink discriminates between 
positive and negative stimuli, as discussed previously, research has not systematically 
disentangled the impact of threatening versus nonthreatening-negative stimuli. Given 
results from Studies 1 and 2, I expect threatening stimuli to enhance startle-eyeblinks 
relative to nonthreatening-negative, positive, or neutral stimuli. When threat is removed 
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from negativity, given the attentional effects just mentioned, it is unclear what impact 
nonthreatening-negative stimuli will have on startle-eyeblinks relative to positive or 
neutral stimuli.  
Method 
 One hundred and fifty-five undergraduates (116 females, 37 males, 2 unspecified) 
participated for partial credit in introductory psychology. Participants were seated in a 
cubicle ~75cm from a 60cm monitor, affixed with stereo headphones, and screened for 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, hearing, and acoustic sensitivity. Skin was lightly 
abraded and cleaned with alcohol to ensure proper impedance. 4mm Ag-AgCl electrodes 
were placed ~20mm apart over the orbicularis oculi muscle under the left eye, with a 
forehead ground (Blumenthal et al., 2005). EMG data were acquired with a BioPac MP36 
amplifier and AcqKnowledge 4.1 software (Biopac, Goleta, CA) at a rate of 2000Hz, 
amplified with a gain of 5000, and notch (60Hz) and band-pass filtered (HP = 10Hz, LP 
= 500Hz) online. Additional stop (57-63Hz) and band-pass (HP = 28Hz, LP = 500Hz) 
filters were applied offline. Raw EMG data were rectified, fully integrated, and averaged 
over 20 samples with the root mean square.  
Instructions explained that participants would view various images and 
occasionally hear a loud noise, with their task being to look at the images. Before the 
critical task, participants sampled the noise-blast – a 50ms binaural burst of 1000Hz, 
100dB white noise (headphones were calibrated daily with a decibel meter). Participants 
subsequently completed 112 trials. Each trial began with a 1000ms presentation of a 
centrally located fixation “X” followed by a 6000ms presentation of a centrally located 
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500 x 500-pixel image, which was followed by an 8000-12000ms between-trial blank 
screen. 28 trials apiece were positive, neutral, nonthreatening-negative, or threatening. 
The image that appeared was fully randomized and no images reoccurred. On 32 critical 
trials (8 of each image type) the noise-probe sounded 2000-4000ms after image onset. 
Probes also sounded during the blank-screen between 16 trials. Presentation order of 
image types and occurrence of probes were fully randomized. This presentation pattern 
was utilized to mitigate the influence of control (i.e., predictability) and maximize the 
likelihood of engaging affective processes (Amodio et al., 2003; Robinson & Vrana, 
2000). Participants were subsequently debriefed and thanked. 
Results  
 Thirty-one participants provided unusable data: 19 were non-responders (i.e., did 
not blink in response to the noise), 8 cringed excessively thereby impeding assessment of 
eyeblink amplitude, and 4 requested to end the study early, which yielded a sample of 
124 participants (94 females, 28 males, 2 unspecified) with a total of 3965 critical trials 
(one session terminated unexpectedly after the participant was exposed to 29 of the 32 
critical trials). 
 Startle-eyeblink amplitude to a given trial was calculated by subtracting the mean 
fEMG amplitude across the 50ms baseline-period preceding the probe from the 
maximum amplitude achieved during the 200ms period following probe onset. 
Occasional trials are unusable (Blumenthal et al., 2005) and I excluded 574 trials across 
participants (14.47% of all trials) due to the absence of a blink (n = 257), blink during 
baseline (n = 161), or excessive orbicularis oculi movement during the trial (n = 156). 
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Exclusion was unrelated to image type, χ2 (3) = 1.99, p = .5726. To control for substantial 
between-person variation in baseline and blink fEMG levels, startle-eyeblink amplitudes 
were standardized within person (Blumenthal et al., 2005). After standardization, I 
excluded amplitudes that varied by at least 2.5 standard deviations from the person-mean 
(n = 70) and exclusion was unrelated to image type, χ2 (3) = 3.18, p = .3642. Examination 
of the 3321 usable trials revealed 8 participants who had responses on 50% or fewer of 
critical trials. Conclusions (based on direction of effects and p-values) are the same with 
or without those 8 participants and I report results that include those participants. 
 I computed for each participant mean startle-eyeblink amplitude to each of the 
four stimuli types (positive, neutral, nonthreatening-negative, threatening) and submitted 
them to a repeated-measures ANOVA. A significant stimulus effect, F(3, 121) = 10.83, p 
= .0001, indicated that amplitudes varied as a function of stimulus type. Consistent with 
predictions, threating stimuli elicited a stronger startle response than did any other 
stimulus type (see Figure 2.3). In particular, startle-eyeblink amplitude was larger to 
threatening stimuli than to nonthreatening-negative, F(1, 123) = 29.86, p = .0001, η2 = 
.20, neutral, F(1, 123) = 9.72, p = .0023, η2 = .07, or positive, F(1, 123) = 21.24, p = 
.0001, η2 = .15, stimuli. Furthermore, startle-eyeblink amplitude to nonthreatening-
negative stimuli was smaller than it was to neutral stimuli, F(1, 123) = 4.05, p = .0465, η2 
= .03,  and equivalent to positive stimuli, F(1, 123) = 0.67, p = .4130, η2 = .01. There was 
no difference in eyeblink amplitude to neutral and positive stimuli, F(1, 123) = 2.36, p = 
.1270, η2 = .02, 
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Figure 2.3. Mean standardized eye-blink amplitude as a function of image type 
 
 
 
Discussion 
Using empirically validated stimuli, the startle paradigm indicated that threatening 
stimuli elicited a stronger reflexive startle response than did nonthreatening-negative, 
positive, and neutral stimuli. These data converge with those of Studies 1 and 2 and point 
to a sensitivity to threat that is distinct from nonthreatening-negativity. Also noteworthy 
is that when threat was removed from negativity the nonthreatening-negative stimuli 
produced a weaker startle-eyeblink than did neutral stimuli. This weaker response makes 
sense given the argument that aversive affect and prolonged attention differentially 
influence startle with aversion enhancing startle (Lang et al., 1990) and attention 
inhibiting startle (Filion, et al., 1998; Vanman et al., 2013). Negative stimuli lacking in 
threat might evoke morbid fascination (Kveraga et al., 2015; Oosterwijk et al., 2015) or 
what could be construed as a temporary approach motivation (i.e. increased attention) to 
determine whether avoidance is necessary (Rimé et al., 2005; Rubenking & Lang, 2014; 
Turner & Silvia, 2006). The interested reader should see the below section on morbid 
fascination for further discussion and exploratory analysis of this possibility. 
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Chapter 2 General Discussion 
I examined the possibility that the mind is particularly sensitive to immediate 
threats to bodily harm. To rectify limitations of past research, I pilot-tested stimuli to 
obtain images that are threatening, nonthreatening-negative, positive, or neutral and 
employed three paradigms assessing differential responses to those stimuli that assess 
very early responses: visual search, eye-tracking, and startle-eyeblink. Consistent with 
the argument that threat is preferentially processed, participants (a) were faster to detect a 
threatening than nonthreatening-negative image when each was embedded among 
positive or neutral images, (b) oriented their initial gaze more frequently toward 
threatening than nonthreatening-negative, positive, or neutral images, and (c) evidenced 
larger startle-eyeblinks to threatening than to nonthreatening-negative, positive, or neutral 
images. These data indicate that threat elicits preferential responses in terms of fast-
detection, initial-attention, and reflexive responding. The mind’s apparent sensitivity to 
threatening stimuli has an important implication for social psychological approaches to 
evaluative processing. Before elaborating on that implication, however, I first consider 
issues regarding my stimulus categories. 
Is the Threat Effect Driven by a Facet of Nonthreatening-Negativity? 
My thesis is that because survival requires rapid response to threats to immediate 
physical harm, the mind should have evolved a preferential sensitivity to such threats 
(e.g., Ӧhman & Mineka, 2001, 2003). Consequently, I created stimulus categories that 
differentiated threatening stimuli from non-threatening negative stimuli (as well as 
positive and neutral stimuli). The curious reader might question whether it is threat per 
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se, or some other facet of the stimuli sets causing the noted effects. One obvious question 
is to whether my nonthreatening-negative stimuli could be further subdivided and 
whether any of those divisions yield different response patterns in regard to threat. To 
explore this possibility, I further categorized the nonthreatening-negative stimuli into 
systematic groupings. Visual inspection (see Appendix) revealed two categories: (1) 
dead/injured animals and (2) repulsive objects (e.g., maggots, excrement, vomit, decayed 
teeth). This categorization maps onto Mikels et al. (2005) analysis with dead/injured 
animals eliciting self-reported sadness and disgust, and repulsive objects eliciting disgust.  
I reanalyzed each study to determine whether the preferential response to 
threatening stimuli was unique to one category of nonthreatening-negative stimuli. In 
Study 1, participants were faster to detect the threatening stimuli (M = 2072.55ms) than 
either dead animals (M = 2211.49ms), F(1, 92) = 40.40, p < .0001, or repulsive object (M 
= 2236.45ms), F(1, 92) = 44.28, p < .0001, and the latter two did not differ, F(1, 92) = 
.03, p = .8730. In Study 2, participants first gazed at the threatening stimulus on 59% of 
trials when paired with a dead animal, t(4524) = 3.35, p = .0008, and on 64% of the trials 
when paired with a repulsive object, t(4524) = 5.37, p < .0001, and those odds did not 
differ, t(4524) = - 1.45, p = .1461, OR = .81. In Study 3, startle-eyeblink amplitude was 
stronger to threats (M = .12) than either dead animals (M = -.20), F(1, 118) = 33.22, p < 
.0001, or repulsive objects (M = -.18), F(1, 118) = 18.39, p < .0001, and the latter two did 
not differ, F(1,118) = .21, p = .6447. Hence, the preferential response (fast detection, 
initial-attention, reflexive response) to threatening stimuli was not driven by a particular 
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facet of my nonthreatening-negative stimuli and occurred in regard to both categories of 
nonthreatening-negative stimuli. 
For the sake of clarity, it should be emphasized that a sensitivity to threatening 
stimuli should manifest in terms of early (i.e., initial or fast) responses. Such an early 
response is functional for the detection and avoidance of immediate harm, which is why I 
measured such responses. If I was to examine slower, more deliberate, or delayed 
responses, it is possible that such responses to particular facets of nonthreatening 
negativity might trump those to threatening stimuli. Again, my thesis pertains to early 
responses and that is where I see evidence for sensitivity to threat.   
Ontogeny versus Phylogeny 
Öhman offered an argument for threat sensitivity in terms of a neural “fear 
module” (Ӧhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Ӧhman & Mineka, 2001, 2003). Such a 
module raises the possibility that sensitivity is conditioned uniquely or more strongly to 
the phylogenetic stimuli (e.g., snakes, spiders) on which it evolved than to ontogenetic 
threats of modern day (e.g., weapons; Blanchette, 2006; Brosch & Sharma, 2005; Fox et 
al., 2007). To explore this possibility, I recoded the threatening stimuli as being either 
ontogenetic (e.g., guns, weapons) or phylogenetic (e.g., animals, fire), and found the 
same functional effect for each. In Study 1, participants were faster to detect the 
ontogenetic (M = 1979ms) than phylogenetic threat (M = 2172ms), F(1, 92) = 47.20, p = 
.0001. Nonetheless, participants were faster to detect either threat type than the 
nonthreatening-negative image (M = 2215ms), Fontogenetic(1, 92) = 100.43, p = .0001 and 
Fphylogenetic(1, 92) = 5.23, p = .0246. In Study 2, initial attention was more likely drawn to 
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both ontogenetic and phylogenetic threats than any other stimulus type. Specifically, (a) 
when paired with a nonthreatening-negative stimulus, participants first gazed at the 
ontogenetic threat on 63% of trials, t(4524) = 5.03, p = .0001, and the phylogenetic threat 
on 60% of trials, t(4524) = 3.68, p = .0002, and their odds did not differ, t(4524) = 0.83, p 
= .4166, OR = 1.13; (b) when paired with a neutral stimulus, participants first gazed at 
the ontogenetic threat on 65% of trials, t(4524) = 5.89, p = .0001, and the phylogenetic 
threat on 71% of trials, t(4524) = 7.36, p = .0001, and their odds did not differ, t(4524) = 
-1.57, p = .1161, OR = 0.78; and (c) when paired with a positive stimulus, participants 
first gazed at the ontogenetic threat on 61% of trials, t(4524) = 4.24, p = .0001, and the 
phylogenetic threat on 66% of trials, t(4524) = 5.97, p = .0001, and their odds did not 
differ, t(4524) = -1.64, p = .1016, OR = 0.78. Lastly, in Study 3, startle-eyeblink 
amplitude did not differ between ontogenetic (M = 0.16) versus phylogenetic (M = 0.08) 
threats, F(1, 119) = 1.14, p = .2883, and they each produced stronger startle-eyeblink 
amplitudes than did the positive, neutral, or nonthreatening-negative images, Fs(1, 119) > 
3.75, ps < 0.055. These data support the idea of a flexible system that learns and 
incorporates an expanding repertoire of what constitutes threat.  
Morbid Fascination 
People experience morbid fascination toward certain negative stimuli (Oosterwijk 
et al., 2015; Rimé et al., 2005; Turner & Silvia, 2006) whereby they pay more attention to 
disgusting content (Rubenking & Lang, 2014). A morbid fascination account of my 
negative results suggests that startle responses to negative stimuli were attenuated relative 
to neutral because negative stimuli both failed to evoke avoidance behaviors and 
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engendered information seeking behaviors (i.e. increased attentional interest). Absent a 
startle enhancing threat component, interest value toward negative stimuli diminished 
startle responses relative to neutral (Filion, et al., 1998; Vanman et al., 2013). If such is 
the case, my eye-tracking data should reveal participants spend more time looking at 
negative paired with neutral stimuli. I analyzed gaze duration data with the expectation 
that morbid fascination would be more evident among persons low (but not high) in 
disgust sensitivity. That is, even though disgust sensitivity did not moderate the stimulus 
in each pair to which participants first gazed in Study 2, persons high in disgust 
sensitivity might intentionally avoid prolonged looking at negative stimuli and hence not 
evidence morbid fascination. 
To test this possibility, I computed for each participant the mean time spent 
looking at each stimulus in the negative-neutral pairing and regressed time onto a 
factorial crossing of mean centered disgust and stimulus (negative vs. neutral), with the 
latter as a within-subject variable. Consistent with morbid fascination, there was a 
Stimulus x Disgust interaction, F(1, 61) = 10.16, p = .0023, indicating that persons low in 
disgust sensitivity spent more time looking at the negative stimulus (M = 2020.18ms, SE 
= 79.26) than neutral stimulus (M = 1170.63ms, SE = 82.80), F(1, 61) = 34.00, p = .0001, 
and persons high in disgust sensitivity looked equally at the negative stimulus (M = 
1527.99ms, SE = 79.26) and neutral stimulus (M = 1335.73ms, SE = 82.80), F(1, 61) = 
1.74, p = .1919. Explained otherwise, disgust sensitivity reduced time spent looking at 
the negative stimulus, b = -431.74ms, t(61) = -4.39, p = .0001 and was unrelated to time 
spent looking at the neutral stimulus, b = 144.83, t(61) = 1.41, p = .1640. Repeating these 
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analyses for the negative-positive pairing and the negative-threatening pairing revealed 
no Stimulus x Disgust interaction for the negative-positive pairing, F(1, 61) = 2.67, p = 
.1072, nor the negative-threatening pairing, F(1, 61) = 0.05, p = .8192, and no tendency 
to differentially look at the negative (M = 1581.50ms, SE = 62.40) vs. positive stimulus 
(M = 1476.21ms, SE = 69.84), F(1, 61) = 0.75, p = .3900, nor the negative (M = 
1454.45ms, SE = 55.58) vs. threatening stimulus (M = 1565.69ms, SE = 51.14), F(1, 61) 
= 1.46, p = .2321.  
Morbid fascination may be functional in that it compels attention toward 
ambiguously negative stimuli; the gory, disgusting, or dead object may signify that a 
threat is nearby, or it may simply be the remnant of a past but no longer salient threat. If 
ambiguity exists, examining the scene to gather information is necessary to plan future 
action. Morbid fascination is therefore one example of an atypical reaction to negative 
stimuli that challenges traditional conceptualizations assuming negativity prompts 
avoidance.  
Implications of Threat Sensitivity for Evaluative Processing 
As I intimated in the introduction, current dual process models do not delineate a 
speed or strength difference between positive and negative implicit evaluations. An 
implicit response to a positive stimulus is assumed equivalent to an implicit response to a 
negative stimulus. The previous studies, however, suggest that such is not so and makes 
plausible a theoretical delineation between implicit evaluative threat processing and 
implicit evaluative valence processing. If evaluation is a dynamic process that unfolds 
over time (Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, & Van Bavel, 2007), threat evaluation may be 
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temporally distinct and prior to valence processing. This implies the possibility of dual 
implicit processes in which an implicit threat process precedes (and potentially 
influences) a subsequent implicit valence process (positive vs. negative) which precedes 
(and potentially influences) explicit processes. In what follows, I integrate those 
processes into a unified Dual Implicit Process Model and demonstrate the conceptual 
value of distinguishing implicit threat processing and implicit valence processing.  
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CHAPTER 33 
THE DUAL IMPLICIT PROCESS MODEL 
The Dual Implicit Process Model (DIPM) postulates two functionally distinct and 
serially-linked automatic evaluative processes: the first implicit process (“i1”) is solely 
oriented toward threats to bodily harm. This process precedes and potentially influences 
the subsequent implicit process (“i2”) that encompasses the full evaluative continuum 
(negative to positive). As I define it, i2 aligns well with notions of automatic and implicit 
evaluative responses in the dual-process models I reviewed earlier. Both i1 and i2 
precede and potentially influence subsequent explicit (“e”) processing (see Figure 3.1). 
Based on findings that threatening stimuli are preferentially processed via the 
low-road (e.g., LeDoux, 1996), the DIPM purports that i1 processing occurs first to 
activate threat responses, given proper input. The slower operating high-road processes 
non-threatening stimuli via i2 to provide more detailed evaluative responses. Given that 
i2 and e functioning are consistent with extant dual-process models, I focus primarily on 
explicating i1. The following sections detail the inputs to i1, outputs of i1, influences on 
the magnitudes of the outputs, and then puts it all together in the full temporal sequence 
of evaluative processing. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Much of Chapter 3 was previously published in March, D., Gaertner, L., & Olson M.A. (2018). On the prioritized 
processing of threat in a dual implicit process model of evaluation. Psychological Inquiry, 29, 1-13. 
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Figure 3.1. Diagram representation of the DIPM
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Inputs to i1 
 Ӧhman (Ӧhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Ӧhman & Mineka, 2001, 2003) 
proposed the idea of threat sensitivity in terms of a neural “fear module,” which implies 
the possibility that threat evaluation is queued uniquely to the phylogenetic stimuli (e.g., 
snakes, spiders) on which it evolved. To be functional, however, a threat evaluation 
process should learn and incorporate new threats (Gould & Vrba, 1982). Indeed, fear in 
humans can be learned both directly through first-hand experience and indirectly through 
social learning, with the amygdala playing a central role in both instances (Olsson & 
Phelps, 2007). Consistent with the possibility of a flexible system, threat-superiority 
research indicates that ontogenetic threats (e.g., modern weapons) and phylogenetic 
threats (e.g., animals, fire) have the same functional effect of being preferentially 
processed (Blanchette, 2006; Brosch & Sharma, 2005; Fox et al., 2007). In Studies1-3, 
for example, participants (a) were faster to detect both ontogenetic and phylogenetic 
threats than negative stimuli, (b) oriented their initial gaze more frequently to both 
ontogenetic and phylogenetic threats than to negative, positive, or neutral stimuli, and (c) 
evidenced larger startle-eyeblinks to both ontogenetic and phylogenetic threats than to 
negative, positive, and neutral stimuli. Hence, i1 is supported by a flexible system that 
learns and incorporates new objects as potential threats.  
Outputs of i1 
 i1 yields two interrelated outcomes: (1) immediate physiological reactions to 
protect/prepare the body from threat and (2) organized downstream information 
processing queued to the threat. Both outcomes function to protect against harm and 
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ensure safety (e.g., via vigilance, active avoidance mechanisms; Bolles & Fanselow, 
1980; Pratto & John; 1991; Intura, Rothermund, & Bak, 2000). 
Physiological outputs. The physiological outputs of i1 are those typically 
associated with responding to threat (LeDoux, 2014), including protective reflexes (e.g., 
freezing, flailing, defensive fighting), autonomic arousal (e.g., pupil dilation, heart rate 
increase, sweating), and neurological activity (e.g., amygdala activation, secretion of 
epinephrine by the adrenal glands). Neurological actions prepare the body to respond to 
threat by instigating overt behavioral movements and autonomic arousal meant to aid the 
body’s response to threat (Löw, Weymar, & Hamm, 2015). Once initiated, such 
responses inevitably run to completion with little opportunity for interruption (i.e., a fixed 
action pattern; Lorenz, 1965).  
Organized downstream processing. Activated i1 organizes downstream 
information processing for a vigilant focus on the threatening stimulus (e.g., Pratto & 
John, 1991). Such organization allocates attentional resources toward gathering further 
information about the threat and is enabled via neuronal pathways between the amygdala, 
supplementary structures, and cortices as explicated by Öhman (2005), LeDoux (1996), 
and others (e.g., Fox, Oler, Tromp, Fudge, & Kalin, 2015). This allows for the possibility 
that i1 can negatively bias the evaluative process of i2 and e in a manner consistent with 
the activated threat. Imagine, for example, three people: Donna dislikes cats, Lisa likes 
cats, and Nancy is neutral toward cats. If each were to encounter a cat in the absence of i1 
activation, Donna’s automatic i2 evaluation would be negative, Lisa’s would be positive, 
and Nancy’s would be neutral. In contrast, if each were to encounter a hissing cat with 
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exposed fangs and arched back, the now activated i1 would negatively bias i2 for all three 
persons (relative to their own prior reaction): Donna would have a faster and more 
negative evaluation; Lisa would have a slower and less positive evaluation; and Nancy 
would have a relatively fast and negative evaluation. Hence, i1 activation influences the 
evaluative process of i2 and alters it from what it would have been absent i1 activation.   
 There is also the possibility that i1 directly effects e (i.e., independent of i2) 
whereby the activated threat is made apparent to e which then processes it directly. For 
example, (neutral) Nancy’s i1 response to the hissing cat promotes active attention to the 
cat with deliberate avoidance (e.g., Nancy might say to herself, “I should avoid that nasty 
cat”). Alternatively, i1 may indirectly affect e via i2. For example, Nancy’s i1 response to 
the hissing cat promotes a negative implicit evaluation of the cat (i.e., i2), which in turn 
could promote a negative explicit evaluation of the cat and deliberate avoidance.  
Magnitude of Outcomes Produced by i1  
The magnitude of i1’s outcomes is determined by the threat’s perceived 
imminence and potency. Threat imminence refers to the proximal distance of the threat in 
time and space, and, all else being equal, the magnitude of the i1 response increases with 
imminence (Fanselow, 1994; Kveraga et al., 2015; Löw, Lang, Smith, & Bradley, 2008; 
Löw et al., 2015; Mobbs et al., 2007). For example, a threat at a greater distance would 
likely elicit less sympathetic arousal and attentional resources than would a threat at a 
closer distance (Löw et al., 2008). Threat potency refers to the presumed capacity of the 
threat to inflict bodily harm (e.g., Lundqvist, Esteves, & Öhman, 1999). That is, some 
threats (e.g., a roaring lion) are perceived to have greater potency to harm than other 
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threats (e.g., hissing cat) and, all else being equal, the magnitude of the i1 response 
increases with potency (Blanchard, Hynd, Minke, Minemoto, & Blanchard, 2001). 
As depicted in Figure 3.2, the resulting magnitude of the i1 response is conditioned 
simultaneously on imminence and potency. When the threat is of high imminence and 
potency, the magnitude of the i1 response is maximized. For example, coming face to 
face with a bear in the woods would activate i1 and yield strong physiological responses 
(e.g., release of epinephrine, elevated heartrate) and highly organized downstream 
cognitive processing of the bear to maximize a protective behavioral response (fight or 
flight). In contrast, viewing a photograph of a bear (or encountering the bear from a 
distance), for which perceived potency remains high but perceived imminence is reduced, 
would activate i1 with a weaker response (physiology, downstream cognition, behavior) 
than in the face-to-face encounter.  
 
Figure 3.2. Threat potency and imminence 
determine magnitude of i1 response. 
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Finally, an interesting possibility to consider is the case of an ambiguous threat, 
such as a creaking floorboard at midnight, a creepy-crawling movement across one’s 
back, or even simply being in darkness or any situation that compromises perceptual 
systems involved in determining object location. Properties of error management 
(Haselton & Buss, 2000) would lead to the over-perception of threat imminence and 
potency (i.e., err on the side of more imminent, and perhaps more potent), which would 
yield a stronger i1 response than would have occurred with accurate perception of the 
creaking as due to the wind rather than an intruder or the creepy-crawling as due to a 
tree-branch rather than a spider.  
Putting it all Together 
 Evaluation absent i1 threat activation follows the evaluative process explicated by 
current dual process models. For instance, imagine standing in a park when in the 
distance, you notice your friend approaching. At this point, an evaluation of your friend is 
activated. i2 activates a (presumably) summary positive association, and likewise 
explicitly you are happy to see your friend. This chain of evaluative events does not 
include an i1 activation, and hence no i1 influence. The conditions laid out by current 
dual process models (e.g., MODE, APE) stipulate that given the motivation and 
opportunity to control one’s responses, the explicit positive attitude toward your friend is 
that likely to be expressed. Alternatively, when a threat is present, the DIPM proposes an 
alternative series of processes from those proposed by current dual process models. For 
example, imagine waiting in that same park, but now instead of approaching from the 
front, your friend sneaks up behind you and scares you. Before consciously (e.g., e) 
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identifying the threat, i1 is activated, involving immediate behavioral and physiological 
responses preparing you to respond to the threat, but also a negative biasing effect 
downstream. The i2 evaluation is now less positive than it would have been absent an i1 
event, as is your explicit evaluation.  
 It may appear to the reader that I am merely tacking on threat processing to dual-
process models, and in a sense, I am. However, i1 is likely to be active in many domains, 
including those often considered within the context of attitudes research (e.g., prejudice), 
as well as in domains into which attitudes researchers are typically more reticent to 
venture (e.g., phobia, intimate partner violence), with implications for evaluative 
responding across them all. Indeed, I believe an important strength of the DIPM is its 
ability to integrate literatures with little cross-talk, highlighting similarities in evaluative 
processing across them, with implications for behavioral responses as well as the 
potential for change. 
 In the next chapter, I discuss the DIPM’s implications for prejudice, and review 
two studies that explore the underlying attitudinal representation leading to prejudice 
toward Black Americans.  
  
` 
 
48 
 
CHAPTER 4 
PREJUDICE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE DUAL IMPLICIT 
PROCESS MODEL 
 The DIPM proposes that the mind preferentially processes threatening stimuli 
over negative and positive stimuli. The DIPM attributes such threat processing to i1 and 
proposes a serial process whereby i1 assesses the threatening stimuli and initiates 
responses separate from i2, which assesses negative or positive stimuli. In the current 
chapter, I describe how such a distinction may elucidate certain types of prejudice, and 
present two studies that test whether the i1/i2 distinction within implicit evaluation 
clarifies unique prejudices toward Black Americans.  
By distinguishing an implicit threat process from an implicit valence process, the 
DIPM suggests that implicit biases toward social groups can be functionally 
distinguished regarding threat versus automatic positive/negative evaluation. This shares 
conceptual overlap with nuanced approaches to prejudice suggesting that different 
intergroup contexts prompt different vulnerabilities (Schaller & Neuberg, 2012) or 
appraisals (Smith, 1993) that evoke different emotional and behavioral responses. This 
distinction implies an underlying mechanism that, in part, gives rise to the distinct 
evaluative and attentional reactions evoked by different stereotyped groups. From an 
evolutionary perspective, certain prejudices are components of risk management systems. 
Distinct types of risk (e.g., risk of violence, risk of contamination, ego risk, risk to 
economic prosperity) should promote functionally specific adaptive strategies to mitigate 
the risk (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2009; Neuberg, Kenrick, 
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& Schaller, 2010; Schaller & Neuberg, 2012). For example, individuals that imply a 
health risk (e.g., sick individuals, homosexuals) evoke disgust and avoidance, while 
individuals that imply risks to group hegemony (e.g., immigrants) elicit anger. Most 
relevant to the current discussion, groups that imply threats to physical safety (e.g., 
Black-Americans, Mexican-Americans) elicit fear, at least among majority groups 
(Schaller & Neuberg, 2012). Groups associated with threat should therefore elicit 
different attentional, behavioral, and evaluative outcomes than nonthreatening groups. 
Such groups would activate i1 and be processed as a survival threat in addition to the 
valenced processing of whether the group is liked/disliked or good/bad. Indeed, 
stereotypes of Black Americans often associate Black individuals with violence, 
criminality, and aggression, concepts that evoke fear of physical threat (i.e., i1; Cottrell 
and Neuberg, 2005). The functional specificity unique to a fear response is most likely to 
be expressed in threat related behaviors and responses associated with responding to 
perceived survival threats (Schaller & Neuberg, 2012).  
 Circumstantial evidence supports the idea that threat has a unique role in 
prejudice toward Blacks. In all these examples, threat cues ostensibly drive processing in 
a manner different than do merely negative or positive cues. As the DIPM proposes, an 
initial threat response should facilitate the processing of a subsequent threat. For 
example, in a shooter task in which participants are instructed to “shoot” only armed 
Black or White men, White Americans are more likely to mistakenly shoot unarmed 
Black than White men (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002). The decision to 
“shoot” is ostensibly a self-protective reaction toward a threatening target. Relatedly, 
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priming participants with Black versus White faces specifically facilitates responding to 
weapons and not tools and leads to increased misidentifications of tools as weapons 
(Payne, 2001), indicating that Black faces share a threat association with weapons. 
Consistent with the idea that Black faces themselves are more threatening than White 
faces, White participants show stronger amygdala activation to both supraliminally 
(Phelps et al., 2000) and subliminally presented Black than White faces (Cunningham et 
al., 2004). The amygdala is particularly attuned to the initial processing of threatening 
information and larger activation in this scenario is thought to reflect an increased threat 
response.  
The startle eyeblink is an amygdala-mediated defensive function meant to protect 
the individual from harm. As my previous research indicated (Study 3 above), people 
show increased startle eyeblinks toward threatening relative to neutral relative to 
positive/negative stimuli. Research using differently raced face stimuli has found that 
Black faces yield stronger startle-eyeblink than do White or Asian faces (Amodio, 
Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 2003), again indicating that Black faces uniquely evoke a 
threat response. Convergent evidence for this position also comes from research looking 
at attentional capture. As my previous work (Study 2 above) showed, initial attention is 
drawn to threatening stimuli more than to positive, negative, or neutral stimuli. Relatedly, 
attention is captured more quickly and held longer by Black than White faces and, 
tellingly, the degree to which Black faces biased attention is directly related to their 
perceived threat relevance (Donders, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2008). Specifically, Black-
danger stereotypes uniquely draw attention to Black faces whereas non-threat-related but 
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negative Black-stereotypes do not. Relatedly, in a study in which White participants rated 
Blacks and Whites on several trait dimensions (e.g., hostile vs. ignorant), being in a well-
lit vs. dim room affects the attribution of hostility but not ignorance (Schaller, Park, & 
Mueller, 2003). Darkness ostensibly signaled threat imminence and affected the threat-
relevance trait (hostile) but not the equally negative but non-threat relevant trait 
(ignorant). And lastly, subliminally priming Black versus White faces led White 
participants engage in a more hostile manner (as rated by an outside observer) toward 
another White interaction partner (Chen & Bargh 1997).  
These results imply that a unique association between Blacks and threat may drive 
prejudice toward Blacks independent of evaluative valence. Consequently, in line with 
theories of intergroup emotion, conceptualizing prejudice in general valanced terms (i.e., 
positive/negative) may lack the necessary specificity to capture the unique causes and 
outcomes of distinct stereotypes. The following two studies explore the differential 
associations of race with valence and threat. 
Study 4 
The current study uses an evaluative priming paradigm to test the associations of 
Black and White with positivity, negativity, and threat. With evaluative priming, 
positively vs. negatively valenced words or images precede the presentation of a target 
(either a word or image) and participants are tasked with indicating whether the target is 
“good” or “bad”. The good/bad decision is faster when the valence of the prime matches 
the valence of the target than when prime and target valence mismatch. In such a 
paradigm, when Black and White faces (or names) are used as primes, White participants 
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typically have an easier time identifying positive target words preceded by White than 
Black faces and, conversely, negative words preceded by Black than White faces (Fazio, 
Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Ito, Willadsen-Jense, Kaye, & Park, 2011). Also, 
Black primes facilitate the identification of negative Black-stereotypic words, while 
White primes facilitate the identification of positive White-stereotypic words 
(Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001). While these measures insinuate an association 
between Black and negativity, the flexibility of words as targets (more so than pictures) 
implies that negative words could apply to both threatening and merely negative attitude 
objects. For example, the word “horrible” aptly describes many negative things (e.g., 
guns, starving children, and dead animals).Yet, it is unclear what is activated when 
participants are tasked with responding to categorically vague negative terms. That is, the 
“bad” target likely confounds negative and threatening stimuli: a cockroach is awful and 
terrible, but so is a person pointing a gun. Therefore, it remains a question of whether 
these results are the consequence of a general Black/negative association or a specific 
Black/threat association.  
It might not be the case that White prejudice toward Blacks is driven by a general 
affective “negativity”. Instead, White-Americans may predominantly associate Black-
Americans with danger, which may manifest as a specific association between Black and 
threat, and not between Black and negativity. If portrayed in a typical priming paradigm, 
the DIPM’s threat versus valence distinction would predict that (1) Black more than 
White will facilitate the identification of threatening things, and (2) White more than 
Black will facilitate the identification of positive things. To the extent to which Black is 
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associated with threat and negativity, Black would facilitate both threat and negativity. 
Study 4 uses a priming task to measure such differential associations. I used a picture-
picture evaluative priming task (Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1994). In particular, (the 
previously piloted tested) pictures of positive, negative, and threating targets were primed 
by pictures of a Black or White face with the dependent variable being the speed with 
which participants indicated whether the target was “good” or “bad.”  To the extent to 
which White participants more strongly associate White than Black with positivity they 
should more quickly respond “good” to a positive picture primed with a White than a 
Black face. The same logic applies to differential associations of White than Black with 
threat and negativity, respectively.  
Methods 
Eighty-One White undergraduates (51 female, 29 male) participated for partial 
credit in an introductory psychology course. Participants sat in individual cubicles 
containing a 48cm high-speed, high-resolution monitor and computer. Instructions 
explained that pairs of pictures would be presented quickly and sequentially with the first 
picture being a face and the second picture being an object and that they should indicate 
as quickly and accurately as possible whether the object (i.e., second picture) is bad or 
good by pressing the “Z” or “/” key, respectively. Participants subsequently completed 
256 trials. Each trial began with a 500ms presentation of a centrally located mosaic image 
that functioned both as a fixation and a pre-mask, which was replaced by a 200ms 
presentation of a Black or White face of neutral expression, which was replaced by a 
200ms presentation of a positive, negative, or threatening target, which was replaced by a 
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100ms presentation of the mosaic (serving as a post-mask). Finally, participants were 
prompted to indicate whether the target was bad or good. A 1500ms blank screen 
separated each trial. Participants then completed a demographics questionnaire and were 
debriefed and thanked.  
I used 30 Black and 30 White neutral faces from the Chicago Face Database (Ma, 
Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015). I cropped each face to 500x500-pixels by confining the 
image to just above the eyebrows to just below the lips, and just outside each eye. I used 
30 positive, 30 negative and 30 threatening targets from the previously pilot image sets. 
Six trials types resulted from the 2 prime and 3 target categories. Specifically, 64 trials of 
a Black or White face were followed by a positive target (128 total) and 32 trials of a 
Black or White face were followed by a negative or threatening target (128 total). To 
ensure that a “good” or “bad” response was correct on equal numbers of trials, there were 
twice as many positive as negative or threatening targets, respectively. Trial order was 
completely randomized, and every image was presented before it reoccurred. 
Results 
The 81 participants yielded 20,736 trials. When examining error rates, I noted that 
four target stimuli (1 positive, 3 negative) garnered an inordinate frequency of incorrect 
responses (averaged 20.61% incorrect vs. an average of 2.8% incorrect for all other 
stimuli). After visual examination of these stimuli, it became apparent that they were 
difficult to discern at the 200ms presentation duration. Therefore, I excluded the 875 
(4.2%) trials involving those 4 target stimuli, yielding 19,861 trials (results below are not 
affected by this exclusion). I subsequently excluded the remaining incorrect trials (n = 
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415, 2%) and any trials (n = 610, 2.9%) with excessively slow responses (>3 interquartile 
ranges above the third quantile; Tukey, 1977; Wentura & Degner, 2010), yielding 18,836 
usable trials. Finally, I excluded three participants who had less than 70% of their initial 
data remaining (results below are not affected by this exclusion). This yielded a sample 
of 78 participants with a total of 18,511 trials. I report the results of inferential tests based 
on natural-log transformed data, and report descriptive statistics based on raw reaction 
times. 
 To test whether Black or White faces differentially facilitated the identification of 
positive, negative, or threatening targets, I submitted the response time judgements to a 
2(Prime: Black, White) x 3(Target: Positive, Negative, Threatening) repeated measures 
ANOVA. Consistent with the possibility derived from the DIP model that White 
participants differentially associate Black and White with positivity, negativity, or threat 
was the significant Prime Race x Target interaction effect, F(2,77) = 17.41, p < .0001. As 
depicted in Figure 4.1, White participants responded (a) faster to positive targets 
preceded by a White (M = 665ms) than Black (M = 681ms) face, F(1,78) = 41.41, p < 
.0001. d = .72, (b) faster to threatening targets preceded by a Black (M = 670ms) than 
White (M = 681ms) face, F(1,78) = 7.14, p = .0092, d = -.30, and (c) equally fast to 
negative targets preceded by either a Black (M = 691) or White (M = 693) face, F(1,78) = 
.36, p = .5492, d = -.067. These data suggest that White-Americans’ prejudice toward 
Black-Americans is driven by both a positive association with White and a threat 
association with Black, but not a mere negative evaluation of Blacks. There was no Prime 
Race effect, F(1,78) = 1.38, p = .2939, though there was a Target effect, F(2,77) = 15.67, 
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p < .0001, indicating that negative targets (M = 692) were responded to more slowly than 
were positive (M = 673), F(1,78) = 20.66, p < .0001, or threatening targets (M = 675), 
F(1,78) = 25.23, p < .0001.  
One might suggest that the previous association of Black and threat is simply a 
replication of the tendency to associate Black with weapons (Payne, 2001). Keep in mind 
that my threat stimuli consist of images of weapons and threatening animals. If the prior 
results are merely a weapons effect, then Black pictures should facilitate response to guns 
but not threatening. Such was not the case. Black (versus white) facilitated responding to 
both guns (Black M = 648ms vs. White M = 656ms), F(1, 78) = 3.34, p = .0716, and 
animals (Black M = 685ms vs. White M = 697ms), F(1, 78) = 4.52, p = .0368, and such 
facilitation did not differ (i.e., Black vs. White x Gun vs. Animal), F(1, 78) = .01, p = 
.9397. Stated otherwise, Black facilitated responses to threatening targets not just guns. 
The pattern is broader than a mere weapons association. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Mean reaction times to respond to each Prime x Target pairing 
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Discussion 
 In line with the DIPM threat vs. valence distinction, these data suggest that White 
American’s associate Blacks with threat and Whites with positivity. Interestingly, no 
differential association as a function of race emerged for merely negative targets. These 
results imply that certain prejudices, particularly those towards groups whose stereotypes 
contain elements that connote physical threat, may arise from a fear-based reaction, and 
not simply an unspecified negative reaction. The lack of a Black/Negative association 
found here contrasts previous research that have found such an effect (e.g., Fazio et al., 
1995). As detailed in the introduction to the current study, those studies used Black and 
White primes and subsequent word targets. It is possible that those negative words could 
also have been captured by threat (e.g., horrible; i.e., a threatening stimulus could 
facilitate “horrible” as could a negative stimulus). By using easily classifiable pictures, 
the current study isolates the category of the target to something more specific than 
valence and more so directly tests the association between Black/White and such 
categories.  
 A methodological limitation of the current study provides the possibility for an 
alternative explanation. Because I only used pictures of Blacks and Whites as primes, it is 
possible that the threat-association is not linked specifically to Blacks, and, instead, is an 
effect that occurs in response to all outgroups. To assess this possibility, I conducted a 
second study using the same basic procedure but with two changes: (1) I primed the 
target images with Black, White, and Asian men and (2) I replaced the original gun 
pictures with new gun pictures (that I pilot tested). The original gun pictures depicted 
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blurred Black and White men holding the guns in ecologically realistic looking scenarios 
(importantly the previously reported results did not differ as a function of the race of the 
gun holder). In the new pictures (which I took myself), the race of the person holding the 
gun is not visible (gloves and long sleeves obscure the skin). 
The results from this conceptual replication again found stronger a positive/White 
than positive/Black association. I also found a stronger positive/Asian than positive/Black 
association, and no difference between Asian and White positive associations. This 
implies that the positive association is not merely lacking when comparing White to any 
outgroup but is specifically lacking from Black relative to White or Asian. Yet, I failed to 
find any group differences in associations toward threat or negative targets. That is, 
Asian, Black, and White primes did not differentially facilitate the identification of 
negative or threatening targets.  
There are three possible explanations for this failure to replicate: (1) the effect 
from Study 4 may be measurement noise, weak, or unreliable, (2) the addition of a third 
prime category may have altered how participants approached the task or affected their 
race-target associations, (3) though I was able to create several combinations of shirt and 
glove colors with different types of guns, the images lost their ecological validity, instead 
appearing more sterile and like each other than the previous gun images. This may have 
led to quick habituation toward these images and a weakened threat-response. I am 
currently replicating the unaltered original paradigm. In study 5, I again explore 
associations among Asian, Black, and White with threat, negativity, and positivity but do 
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so using a methodology that improves upon evaluative priming, and reaction time 
measures in general. 
Study 5 
A limitation of traditional reaction time measures of evaluation (e.g., the priming 
measure used above) is that they only capture the output of the evaluation process. That 
is, they record an overall reaction time to click a key yoked to the identity/category of 
some class of object relative to some other class of object. Such responses give no 
information about the process that led to the click of that key, only how long it took to 
engage in such a behavior. This obscures the process(es) that take(s) place over the time-
course of evaluation toward that outcome. As I subsequently discuss, to determine if the 
response to threat indeed occurs first (and does not just result in the faster click of a key), 
an online measure of response is necessary.  
Mouse-tracking is an example of an online measure that dynamically captures 
responding in real-time as it is occurring. Mouse-tracking involves recording and 
analyzing the on-screen pathway that people take en route to choices. Within a mouse-
tracking study, participants are presented with images and are tasked with moving the 
mouse to click one of two labels that correspond to the images. Participants respond by 
moving the mouse from a fixed “Start” position located at the bottom-center of the screen 
to click on one of two options positioned respectively in the top left and right corners of 
the screen.  
For example, imagine a mouse tracking study where the task is to categorize 
people as “Black” or “White”; once a participant clicks “Start” they are presented with an 
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image (e.g., a White man) and would proceed to move the mouse toward and click on the 
label (i.e., “White”) that correctly identifies the presented person. Recorded is the (a) x- 
and y-coordinates of motion, (b) latency of motion, and (c) selected option. Across trials, 
aggregated latencies and trajectories are computed and provide empirical insight into 
response competition (i.e., when a stimulus activates more than one response such that 
both responses compete for dominance). Response competition is a product of how much 
each stimulus is associated with the respective labels, the target label and the distractor 
label. For instance, in a recent study, participants classified images of racially typical or 
racially ambiguous (e.g., light-skinned African American) “Black” and “White” faces 
while their mouse trajectories were recorded (Freeman & Ambady, 2011). As the amount 
of racial ambiguity increased (i.e., as skin-tone lightened among Blacks or darkened 
among Whites), hand trajectories showed related increases in attraction toward the 
incorrect race-category (i.e., increased mouse movement toward Black for dark-skinned 
Whites, and toward White for light-skinned Blacks). This indicates that response 
competition increased as ambiguity increased. Mouse tracking is unique in that it allows 
the researcher to map and measure the impact of such response competition over time.  
By mapping these real-time dynamics, I can assess how multiple processes 
temporally interact and how unique information sources differentially influence 
evaluation across the decision-making process. For example, if using mouse-tracking to 
classify combinations of angry or happy, Black or White faces (e.g., angry Black, angry 
White, happy Black, happy White) based on their expressions (e.g., identifying happy 
faces as “cheerful” vs angry faces as “dangerous”), two processes are interactively 
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affecting categorization: (1) the race of the face (Black vs White), and (2) the expression 
on the face (angry vs happy). Both the race and expression of a face function as separate 
influences of processing which may manifest as response competitors. In a mouse-
tracking paradigm, these separate characteristics of a stimuli may compete for responses 
if the expression on the face is incongruent with the stereotype of the race (e.g., anger on 
a White face, happiness on a Black face) or, alternatively, may synergize responses if the 
expression on the face is congruent with stereotypes of the race (e.g., anger on a Black 
face, happiness on a White face). I will subsequently describe an analysis technique 
wherein I analyzed responses across the time-series to estimate when in the time-course 
the processing of unique characteristics (e.g., facial expression) of the stimuli began to 
affect evaluation. By looking at when mouse movement paths diverged from each other 
and the size of that divergence, I estimated when (i.e., early vs late in the time-course) 
and how much (i.e., in terms of magnitude difference) response competition affected 
evaluative response.  
I present participants on each trial with a picture of an Asian, Black, or White 
man displaying an angry, sad, happy, or neutral facial expression, and the participant 
must move the mouse to choose one of two labels that describes the man (dangerous, 
depressed, cheerful, or calm). For example, when the face is angry the correct target label 
is dangerous and across blocks that label is paired with each of the other labels 
(depressed, cheerful, or calm). Likewise, when the face is neutral the correct target label 
is calm and across blocks that label is paired with each of the other labels (dangerous, 
depressed, cheerful).  
` 
 
62 
 
The time-course of the participant’s decision can provide insight as to whether 
White American’s prejudice is driven by unique associations between Black and threat, 
or whether such a threat association is a more general outgroup effect (i.e., extends to 
Blacks and Asians), and whether non-threatening negativity is also involved. In 
particular, if White Americans associate Blacks with threat, then the presentation of a 
Black face should produce differential response competition between the selection of 
dangerous vs calm, cheerful, or depressed. If the Black face is angry, for example, the 
latter labels should distract less from the movement to “dangerous” than the extent to 
which “dangerous” distracts from the movement to the other labels when the Black face 
is not angry. If such patterns are a more general outgroup effect, then they should 
similarly occur for Asian faces.  
In the current study I mapped the time-course of White participants processing of 
angry, happy, neutral, and sad Asian, Black, and White faces. Through this design, I 
examined how people’s early reactions to differently raced faces differed as a function of 
negative, neutral, positive, and threat. Though the subsequently described analysis I 
estimated when those early reactions began to differ. By including Asian faces, I tested 
the unique influence of Black beyond that of simply any out-group face. By including 
two types of negative face along with a positive and neutral face, I tested the unique 
influence of threat beyond that of mere valence.  
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Pilot Study 
 No high-quality face databases could be located that contained all of the necessary 
facial expressions, so I created my own. I initially gathered 20 neutral faces of each race 
(Asian, Black, and White) from the Chicago Face Database (Ma et al., 2015). To create 
four expression categories for each face (angry, happy, neutral, and sad), I created angry, 
happy, and sad templates within a face morphing program (i.e., FaceGen).  the same 
template to each face to ensure that a given expression displayed roughly equal intensity 
across the faces (e.g., all angry faces were equally angry). This application process 
involved several steps. One at a time, I imported 20 neutral faces from each race (60 
total) into FaceGen. Importing each face involved designating 11-points on the model 
image that correspond to 11-points on a race-matched template 3D head prebuilt within 
FaceGen. The program then overlays the model’s skin over a fungible 3D template head. 
First, the just-imported neutral face was exported to ensure that it matched the look and 
feel of each of the emotionally morphed faces (in terms of the digitalization resulting 
from importing/exporting from the program). Each emotion template was then applied, 
one at a time, at which point each newly morphed emotional face was exported. This 
process resulted in 60 angry faces (20 Asian, 20 Black, and 20 White), 60 happy face, 60 
neutral faces, and 60 sad faces (240 total). These images were subsequently uniformly 
cropped to 450 x 650-pixels. 
I subsequently piloted the cropped 240 images (80 Asian, 80 Black, and 80 
White) and collected 165 between-subjects ratings of how angry, happy, or sad each face 
looked. I excluded 5 participants who responded faster than 500ms on >20% of their 
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trials, resulting in 160 participants providing 38,053 ratings. I deleted individual ratings 
that were faster than 500ms (N = 666, or 1.75%) or slower than 10000ms (N = 279, or 
.73%), resulting in 37,108 usable ratings. Based on visual examination, I excluded 12 
models (each of their 4 faces; 2 Asian, 3 Black, & 7 White) from subsequent analyses due 
to face-morphing that caused them to appear abnormal (e.g., double nose, teeth bared, 
severe eye occlusion). I first calculated a mean score of each rating (e.g., angry, happy, 
sad) for each face (i.e. every face had 3 mean ratings). I then created Z-scores for each 
face within its emotional expression X rating type grouping using that group’s mean and 
standard deviation. For example, separate Z-scores were created within the anger images 
for each rating of anger, happiness, and sadness, rendering three Z-scores for each face. I 
subsequently deleted 6 models (2 Asian, 1 White, and 3 Black) whose mean rating of any 
one of their three emotional faces fell greater than 2SD below the mean of any of their 
three group means (note, no face had a rating greater than 2SD above its group mean). I 
then excluded three models (3 Asian) whose neutral faces were rated greater than 2SD 
above the neutral group mean on any rating, leaving 14 Asian, 14 Black, and 12 White 
models. Lastly, I visually excluded models until each race group contained 10 models. 
These faces were used in the subsequently described main study (see Appendix for all 
images).  
Method 
One-hundred and twenty undergraduates participated for partial credit in an 
introductory psychology course. Participants sat in individual rooms containing a 48cm 
high-speed, high-resolution monitor and computer. Since there is no “neutral” expression 
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label, I chose not to use the terms “happy”, “angry”, or “sad” to identify each respective 
expression. I instead instructed participants that I was “trying to find pictures of faces that 
can be quickly identified as either: Cheerful, Dangerous, Depressed, or Calm. So that 
they knew how to identify each face, each expression was first described: “Cheerful faces 
look happy, friendly, joyful. Dangerous faces look angry, scary, threatening. Depressed 
faces look sad, gloomy, unhappy. Calm faces look emotionless, neutral, flat.” Each block 
presented only two facial expressions (e.g., angry vs. neutral) and their accompanying 
labels (e.g., “Dangerous” vs. “Calm”; see Figure 4.2). Participants were reminded of the 
description for the appropriate labels just prior to each block. They were told that for 
every trial they would see an image on the screen, and their task was to use the mouse to 
as quickly and accurately as possible classify the face by clicking the correct label. Each 
trial began with the appearance of two labels and a “Start” button. Once participants click 
the start button, a single face image appeared. The image disappeared once participants 
click within the boundaries of one of the two labels or 2000ms have passed. To ensure 
online processing, participants received a warning if they failed to begin moving the 
mouse before 400ms. Before the critical blocks, participants undertook one block of 10 
practice trials where they classified pictures of fruits and vegetables as “fruit” or 
“vegetable”. 
Participants experienced six blocks of trials. Each block contained 60 trials 
presenting a pair of facial expressions and their associated labels (e.g., “Dangerous” vs. 
“Calm”). For the first 30 trials, one label was located on the left and other on the right 
side of the screen, and those labels subsequently switch sides on the second set of 30 
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trials (with the starting position, left vs. right, randomized across participants). On each 
trial, participants viewed a face (either Asian, Black, or White) displaying one of the two 
expressions corresponding to the labels for that block. Participants were tasked with 
moving the mouse to the label that reflects the expression displayed on the face. That is, 
one label reflects the target expression (i.e., the one displayed on the face) while another 
label functioned as a distractor (i.e., not displayed on the face). Across the six blocks, 
each expression equally served as a target and a distractor (angry-sad, angry-neutral, 
happy-sad, happy-neutral, or sad-neutral) totaling 360 trials. Across blocks, expressions 
occurred equally within and across each race. The order of the six blocks was randomly 
assigned. Following the six blocks, participants completed a basic demographics 
questionnaire (race, gender, age), and were debriefed and thanked. 
Data Preparation 
 The data were imported into the mouse-tracking analyzer program, which (a) 
equated mouse paths for trials in which the target-expression label was on the right versus 
Figure 4.2. Sample trial from Study 5. 
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the left by horizontally re-mapping all right-side trials to the left, and (b) separated each 
trial into 20ms bins corresponding to the refresh rate of the mouse (e.g., a 1000ms trial 
would yield 50 bins and a 2000ms trial would yield 100 bins). Data were then imported 
into SAS for subsequent analyses. The 120 participants provided a total of 41,907 trials. I 
subsequently deleted 770 (1.8%) incorrect trials and 421 (1%) trials on which participants 
timed out (i.e., took longer than 2000ms). As mouse-tracking is an online measure, it is 
important that participants do not wait until they have decided before moving the mouse 
toward their response. Therefore, it is typical to delete trials where participants fail to 
quickly initiate movement. I subsequently deleted 2,549 (6%) trials on which participants 
first movement was greater than 300ms. Lastly, I deleted 1,414 (3.3%) trials that were 
completed abnormally fast (< 600ms). This yielded 36,753 usable trials. Note that 
patterns of the below results do not change as a function of these exclusions.  
Each 20ms time bin contains the X- and Y-coordinate position of the mouse 
across the duration of the trial (e.g., see the dashed line in Figure 4.3) The mouse tracking 
software also provides for each trial metrics that describe the shape and total time of the 
response. Specifically, each trial has an associated (1) reaction time (RT), which is the 
duration from clicking the start button to clicking a response, (2) area under the curve 
(AUC), which is the total area between a hypothetical straight line running from the start-
button to response and the actual path taken from start to response, (3) the maximum 
deviation (MD), which quantifies the maximum distance from the hypothetical straight 
line to the actual response path, and (4) the maximum deviation time (MD Time), which 
is the time in the trial at which maximum deviation occurred. 
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 Each metric provides insight into a particular aspect of the mouse path. However, 
none of the default metrics provide hypothesis relevant information regarding the point in 
time at which participants began moving relatively closer to the target versus distractor 
label. Using Figure 4.3 as an example, notice that any pure vertical movement brings the 
mouse simultaneously closer to both the target and distractor labels. Likewise, simple 
horizontal movement is insufficient as well. For example, an early leftward movement 
from the start certainly brings the mouse closer to the target label (i.e., calm). But a 
leftward movement at the bottom of the screen is further from the target than is the same 
leftward movement at the top of the screen. Hence, what is needed is to calculate at each 
data-point the relative Euclidean distance of the mouse from the target expression vs. the 
distractor expression. 
  The Euclidean distance reflects the straight-line distance between two points in 
space and is given by the formula: 
Figure 4.3. Visual representation of a trial response. 
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𝑑𝑖 = √(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑙)2 + (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑙)2 
This formula uses the x and y coordinates to derive d, the distance of the mouse cursor at 
every i-th time point from the last time point, l. In addition to Euclidean distance to the 
selected response, it is also necessary to account for the distance to the unselected 
response. Recall as the mouse moves vertically along the Y-axis it is simultaneously 
getting closer to the selected and unselected responses at the same rate. Therefore, to 
calculate the relative pull along the horizontal axis toward both options, it is necessary to 
also calculate the Euclidean distance to the unselected response. This is done by inverting 
the X-values at every i-th time point in the above formula. From these two values I 
derived a Euclidean distance difference score by subtracting the distance to the distractor 
from the distance to the target response. As can be seen in the top panel of Figure 4.4, the 
difference score forms a sigmoidal-shaped (i.e., s-shaped) curve over time. The initial 
horizontal movement along the curve at or around zero is actually vertical movement 
bringing the mouse equally closer to both target and distractor labels. This period is 
followed by a positive exponential slope that reflects movement closer to the target than 
the distractor. The curve eventually asymptotes as the mouse-cursor reaches the selected 
response. 
The same s-curve is found in a number of literatures, particularly those interested 
in modeling patterns of microbial and bacterial growth in different environments. These 
fields have generated several equations for estimating biologically significant parameters 
in the bacterial growth curve with the goal of predicting food safety and shelf life. These 
models are derived from earlier forms of these equations describing sigmoidal growth 
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Figure 4.4. (a) Actual estimated difference of Euclidean Distances. (b) Typical bacterial 
growth curve.  
 
 
curves simply in terms of mathematical parameters. Two widely used equations are the 
Gompertz (Gibson, Bratchell, & Roberts, 1988; Buchanan & Phillips 1990; Garthright, 
1991) and the Baranyi (Baranyi & Roberts 1994; Baranyi, Robinson, Kaloti, & Mackey, 
1995). Reparametrizing the original equations occurred by deriving biological parameters 
as a function of the mathematical parameters and then including them in a new equation 
(e.g., Borglin, et al., 2012; Zwietering, Jongenburger, Rombouts, & Riet, 1990). Several 
studies have examined the relative performance of these two models and have shown 
them both to be highly accurate (Baty, Delignette-Muller, 2004; Buchanon, Whiting, & 
Damert, 1997; Swinnen, Bernaerts, Dens, Geeraerd, & Van Impe, 2004), with 
consistency of the predicted parameters depending on the quality of the dataset (i.e., 
many time-points). The reparametrized Gompertz and Baranyi formulas are: 
Lag phase Exponential phase Stationary phase 
λ Time (t) 
a. 
b. 
𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑛 
𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥 
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𝑦𝑡 =  𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑛 +  𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑒 {−𝑒 [
𝜇𝑚𝑒
𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥
(𝜆 − 𝑡) + 1]}            Gompertz 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥 +  ln (
−1 + 𝑒𝜇𝑚𝜆 + 𝑒𝜇𝑚𝑡
(−1+ 𝑒𝜇𝑚𝑡) + 𝑒(𝜇𝑚𝜆+ 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑛)
)        Baranyi 
In these formulas, ymin represents the lower asymptote of the growth curve, ymax is 
the upper asymptote, t is time, and μm represents the maximum growth rate (ln = natural 
log; e is a mathematical constant whose value is approximately 2.718). Most relevant to 
the current study, these reparametrized models also provide an estimate of the lag period 
or lag phase (λ), which in biological terms is the adjustment period when bacterial cells 
acclimate to a new environment and transitions from zero growth to exponential growth 
(see bottom panel Figure 4.4). The point at which the lag phase ends, what I herein refer 
to as the lag time, describes the beginning of exponential growth. When applied to the 
current data, lag time describes when mouse-path responses began to move relatively 
closer to the target than distractor. To get the precise timing of this early turn toward the 
selected response, I adapted this method to estimate and subsequently analyze lag time.  
While it may seem that MD-time could provide a close approximation for the 
final turn toward the selected category, in reality the MD often occurs at a time other than 
the initial turn toward the selected response. For example, in Figure 4.5, the light line 
represents the actual path (taken from the current study), the solid black line reflects the 
hypothetical straight path, and the short black line at the top of the path represents the 
MD. For comparison, I have copied the same short black line to a point of maximum 
deviation closer to the initial turn. As can be seen, the actual MD occurs later in time than 
the initial turn toward the chosen category. The early deviation is smaller than the MD as 
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                            Figure 4.5. Maximum deviation location 
 
 
indicated by the black line protruding beyond the response path. Therefore, MD-time will 
often give an incorrect account of when the path actually began to turn toward the chosen 
response. As will be shown below, lag time provides an accurate estimate of this 
hypothesis relevant information. 
Each subject experienced 10 trials of each of the 12 target-label and distractor-
label pairings for each of the three races (e.g., 10 trials of dangerous paired with 
depressed for a Black angry face). I estimated a lag time for each subject’s mouse 
movement to each of the 36 pairings. To do so, I first created an average response path 
for each subject across the ten trials of a given race, target, and distractor pairing (e.g., 
sad Asian with depressed and cheerful labels). For each average response path, I 
calculated the difference in Euclidean distance to the target versus distractor at each time 
point. 
 
` 
1 Proc NLIN allows inputted starting values to facilitate the iterative estimation of model parameters . I generated 
starting values by fitting in Excel the average model (i.e., averaging across all participants). Proc NLIN allows 
parameter estimates to be restricted within a reasonable boundary. Lag time has to be within 0 and 2 seconds (i.e., it 
could not occur before a trial starts or after it ends) and ymax has to be between a Euclidean distance of 0 and 2 (the 
smallest and largest values in the units used by the MouseTracker program). Conclusions based on p-values and 
direction of effects are the same with and without the latter two bounds, but using the bounds lead to higher 
convergence rates and, hence, the retention of more data (i.e., 99.46% vs 97.04% convergence rates for Gompertz and 
99.65% vs 97.23 for Baranyi). 
 
2
 I averaged the predicted lag time from the Gompertz and Baranyi models only when both models converged. Of the 
original 4,226 trial-type means, 23 failed to converge in the bound Gompertz model and 15 failed to converge in the 
bound Baranyi model. The 4,199 that converged for both models had an average pseudo R-squared of 94.28% 
indicating excellent model fit. Conclusions based on p-values and direction of effects were the same when estimated 
lag-times from poorer fitting models (i.e., R2 < 80%) were excluded. The reported results include all estimates.  
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I fit each participant’s time by Euclidean difference data to the Gompertz model 
and Baranyi model, respectively, using SAS Proc NLIN (a non-linear regression 
procedure).1 For each model, SAS estimated parameter values for ymin, ymax, μm, and lag 
time. I then averaged the estimated tag time from the Gompertz and Baranyi models for 
each of the 36 target-distractor pairings for each participant.2 
Results 
 Because each target label was paired on a given trial with one of the other three 
labels as distractors, target and distractor were not fully crossed (e.g., dangerous was 
paired with cheerful, depressed, and calm, but not with itself, as in dangerous vs. 
dangerous). Consequently, I submitted lag times for each target label to separate 3(race) x 
3(distractor-label) multi-level ANOVAs using SAS Proc Mixed. For each analysis, I used 
Kenwood-Rodgers degrees of freedom and log-likelihood tests to determine which 
random effects, beyond a random intercept, were necessary. In no instance would models 
converge with a random race effect and or a random Race x Distractor effect. All models 
included a random intercept and random effect for distractor. For ease of interpretation, I 
present the analyses of lag time separately within each target facial expression. See the 
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Appendix for supplementary analysis of other the mouse-tracking metrics (MD, AUC, 
MD Time).  
Angry face. When viewing angry faces, there were main effects of race, F(2,687) 
= 18.85, p <.0001, and distractor, F(2,229) = 18.88, p <.0001, and no interaction, 
F(4,687) = 1.08, p = .3650. As depicted in Figure 4.6, the race effect indicates when the 
face was angry, Black faces led to shorter lag times than did White or Asian faces. In 
particular, persons moved earlier in time to dangerous when the angry face was Black (M 
= 498ms) than when it was White (M = 527ms), t(687) = -4.30, p <.0001, or Asian (M = 
538ms), t(687) = 5.95, p <.0001, and lag time to angry White vs. Asian faces did not 
differ, t(687) = 1.63, p =.102. The lack of an interaction indicates that the earlier lag to 
dangerous for angry Black faces (vs angry White or Asian faces) did not vary as a 
function of the distractor label (cheerful, depressed, or calm). The distractor effect 
indicates that when the face was angry, cheerful had less influence on the lag time to 
dangerous than did depressed or calm. In particular, persons moved earlier in time to 
dangerous when it was paired with cheerful (M = 499ms) than when it was paired with 
calm (M = 518ms), t(229) = -2.40, p = .017, or depressed (M = 547ms), t(230) = -6.10, p 
= .0001 (see also below Figure 4.10 and Table A.1 in Appendix). 
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Figure 4.6. Euclidean distance difference scores plotted across time for angry faces (and 
area-of-focus on lag time) as a function of Race and Distractor.  
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Sad face. When viewing sad faces, there was no main effect of race, F(2,691) = 
.07, p = .9349, but there was a main effect of distractor, F(2,230) = 30.71, p <.0001, and 
an interaction, F(4,691) = 7.84, p < .0001. As depicted in Figure 4.7, the distractor effect 
indicates that when the face was sad, cheerful had less influence on the lag time to 
depressed than did dangerous and calm. In particular, persons moved earlier in time to 
depressed when it was paired with cheerful (M = 493ms) than when it was paired with 
either dangerous (M = 539ms), t(230) = 5.04, p <.0001, or calm (M = 563ms), t(230) = -
7.72, p <.0001.  
The interaction indicates that movement to depressed occurred later in time when 
it was paired with dangerous and the sad face was Black (M = 573ms) than either Asian 
(M = 519ms), t(688) = -3.81, p =.0002, or White (M = 523ms), t(690) = 3.56, p =.0004, 
and dangerous did not have a differential effect on sad Asian vs. White faces, t(690) = -
.24, p =.8117. Conversely, movement to depressed occurred earlier in time when it was 
paired with cheerful and the sad face was Black (M = 477) than either Asian (M = 
498ms), t(692) = 2.12, p =.0344, or White (M = 513ms), t(692) = -3.14, p =.0001, and 
cheerful did not have a differential effect on sad Asian vs. White faces, t(691) = -1.02, p 
=.3081. Movement to depressed did not differ across the three race faces when it was 
paired with calm, ts < 1.6, ps > .11. 
 
 
 
 
` 
 
77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Euclidean distance difference scores plotted across time for sad faces (and 
area-of-focus on lag time) as a function of Race and Distractor. 
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Happy face. When viewing happy faces, there was no main effect of distractor, 
F(2,233) = 1.99, p = .1391, but there was a main effect of  race, F(2,694) = 18.30, p 
<.0001, and an interaction, F(4,694) = 4.78, p =.0008. As depicted in Figure 4.8, the 
race effect indicates that when the face was happy, Black faces led to longer lag times 
than did White or Asian faces. In particular, persons moved later in time to cheerful 
when the happy face was Black (M = 539ms) than when it was White (M = 498ms), 
t(694) = 5.75, p <.0001, or Asian (M = 506ms), t(694) = -4.51, p <.0001, and lag time to 
happy White vs. Asian faces did not differ, t(695) = 1.24, p =.2137. 
The interaction indicates that movement to cheerful occurred later in time when it 
was paired with dangerous and the happy face was Black (M = 544ms) than either Asian 
(M = 490ms), t(693) = -4.49, p <.0001, or White (M = 483ms), t(691) = 5.04, p <.0001, 
and dangerous did not have a differential effect on happy Asian vs. White faces, t(693) = 
.53, p =.5933. Likewise, movement to cheerful occurred later in time when it was paired 
with depressed and the happy face was Black (M = 548ms) than either Asian (M = 
498ms), t(697) = -4.13, p <.0001, or White (M = 501ms), t(691) = 3.91, p =.0001, and 
depressed did not have a differential effect on happy Asian vs. White faces, t(693) = -.23, 
paired with calm, ts < 1.86, ps > .06. 
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Figure 4.8. Euclidean distance difference scores plotted across time for happy faces (and 
area-of-focus on lag time) as a function of Race and Distractor.  
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Neutral face. When viewing neutral faces, there was a main effect of race, 
F(2,692) = 11.40 p <.0001, a main effect of distractor, F(2,231) = 5.48, p = .0047, and an  
interaction, F(4,692) = 6.12, p <.0001. As depicted in Figure 4.9, the race effect indicates 
that when the face was neutral, Black faces led to longer lag times than did White or 
Asian faces. In particular, persons moved later in time to calm when the neutral face was 
Black (M = 554ms) then either White (M = 527ms), t(691) = 4.44, p <.0001, or Asian (M 
= 531ms),  t(692) = -3.77, p =.0002, and the lag time to neutral White vs. Asian faces did 
not differ, t(693) = .66, p =.5125. The distractor effect indicates that when the face was 
neutral, depressed had more influence on the lag time to calm than did cheerful or 
dangerous. Specifically, persons moved later in time to calm when it was paired with 
depressed (M = 550ms) than either cheerful (M = 525ms), t(231) = -3.30, p =.0011, or 
dangerous (M = 536ms), t(260) = -1.85, p =.0655, and the lag time to calm paired with 
cheerful vs. depressed did not differ, t(230) = 1.45, p =.1483.  
The interaction indicates that movement to calm occurred later in time when it 
was paired with dangerous and the neutral face was Black (M = 568ms) than either Asian 
(M = 524ms), t(690) = -4.14, p <.0001, or White (M = 516ms), t(690) = 4.90, p <.0001, 
and dangerous did not have a differential effect for neutral Asian vs. White faces, t(690) 
= .76, p =.4492. Likewise, movement to calm occurred later in time when it was paired 
with depressed and the neutral face was Black (M = 573ms) than either Asian (M = 
549ms), t(692) = -2.31, p =.0209, or White (M = 530ms),  t(695) = 4.09, p <.0001, and 
depressed did not have a differential effect for neutral Asian vs. White faces, t(693) = 
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Figure 4.9. Euclidean distance difference scores plotted across time for neutral faces (and 
area-of-focus on lag time) as a function of Race and Distractor.  
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1.79, p =.0742. Movement to calm did not differ across the three races when it was paired 
with cheerful, ts < 1.41, ps > .16. 
Discussion 
In the current study, I used mouse-tracking to test whether differential 
associations between races (Black, White, Asian) and attributes (Dangerous, Cheerful, 
Depressed, Calm) affected how people evaluated these groups. Different groups have 
unique stereotype profiles, and these unique profiles should lead to specific evaluative 
associations. Most relevant to the DIP perspective, there are prevalent stereotypes 
associating Blacks with violence/criminality. Therefore, I expected that responses to 
Black faces would be specifically affected by the presence of the Dangerous (i.e., threat-
relevant) label, either as a target or distractor. Alternatively, Whites and Asians are more 
associated with positive traits, and hence it was expected that responses to these groups 
would be uniquely influenced by the presence of the Cheerful (i.e., positive) label. By 
including Asians, I tested whether these effects relate to specific groups as more than 
simple in- versus out-group bias. To explore these predictions, I used mouse-tracking to 
see when in time responses turned toward the correct classification of these groups for 
each target by distractor pairing. By looking at lag times and comparing these across race 
and distractor pairings, I can assess both the association between each race and the target 
attribute and the association between each race and the distractor. In this way, as the 
results below outline, both earlier and later lag times convey useful information about the 
relative strength of such associations. 
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If indeed Black is associated with threat, a Dangerous target would lead to earlier 
lag times for Black than White or Asian faces, and conversely, a Dangerous distractor 
would lead to later lag times for Black than White or Asian faces. This hypothesis was 
consistently supported by the patterns of results presented above. Specifically, when the 
face was angry, regardless of the distractor (Cheerful, Calm, Depressed), participants 
moved to the Dangerous label earlier in time (i.e., shorter lag time) when responding to 
Black than to White or Asian faces (top row of Figure 4.10). Conversely, when 
Dangerous served as a distractor to non-angry faces (Happy, Sad, Neutral), people turned 
toward the target label later in time (i.e., longer lag time) when the face was Black than 
when it was White or Angry (first column of above Figure 4.10). In other words, when 
responding to threat was the goal, responses to angry Black faces were inflexible and 
efficient, however, responses to non-angry Black faces were influenced by the threat 
association. Such a primacy of threat vs. negative processing is most apparent when 
comparing how Dangerous distractors competed within responses to sad (i.e., negative) 
Black faces versus how Depressed distractors failed to compete with responses to angry 
Black faces. These patterns indicate both that the processing of the threat evoked by 
Black faces is insulated from response competition evoked by other distractors and, more 
so, that the Black/threat association interfered with responses to ostensibly innocuous 
Black faces. This supports the DIPM supposition that i1 threat processing is unique and 
processed efficiently in a manner relatively unaffected by response competition. 
Alternatively, sad expressions ostensibly processed by i2 are susceptible and affected by 
alternative more relevant processes. More so, responses to White and Asian faces were  
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Figure 4.10. Area-of-focus on lag times of each race in every level of Target by 
Distractor. Note: White and Asian lines often overlap. 
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equal within each of these pairings, indicating that the prior patterns are not simply an 
outgroup effect but are unambiguously linked to Black faces.  
In addition to a Black/threat association, I also posited the possibility of positive 
associations (i.e., cheerful/happy) with White/Asian, and perhaps a non-threatening 
negative association (i.e., depressed/sad) with Black. Given each groups stereotype 
profile, it was expected that Whites would more strongly associate White and Asian with 
happiness. In addition to (or because of) the Black/threat association, it is also possible 
that Whites associate Black with negative attributes in general. These expectations were 
generally supported. Specifically, when the target face was sad (second row of Figure 
4.10), people turned toward Depressed earlier for Black than White or Asian faces when 
Cheerful was the distractor. Yet, when the target face was happy (third row of Figure 
4.10), people turned earlier toward Cheerful for White and Asian than Black faces when 
Depressed was the distractor. Together these patterns seem to indicate (a) a stronger 
association between White and Asian than Black with positivity, (b) a stronger 
association between Black than White or Asian with sad, or (c) both. This interpretation 
is partially supported by people showing later turns toward Calm for neutral Black than 
White or Asian faces when Depressed was the distractor. However, people showed no 
differential response as a function of race to either (1) Cheerful or Depressed when Calm 
served as the distractor or (2) Calm when Sad served as the distractor. These latter 
patterns would seem to indicate indicate no differential association between Black, 
White, or Asian with happiness or sadness. To rectify these patterns, it may help to 
consider the DIPM proposal that i1 threat can manifest as i2 negativity. In that light, it 
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could be that non-threatening target by non-threatening distractor patterns showing 
differential lag time to Black faces (e.g., earlier: sad faces paired with cheerful distractor; 
later: happy and neutral faces paired with sad distractor) are partially driven by the i1 
threat response manifesting as a congruently negative downstream process (i.e., sadness). 
In these blocks, there is a negatively valenced label which may serve as an outlet for such 
biased processing. In other pairings lacking a negative label (e.g., Happy face with 
Neutral distractor, Neutral face with Happy distractor), such an i1 bias on i2 has no 
consequence as there is no negative label for which any i1 negative can affect.  
Taken as a whole these results indicate that the underlying mechanism driving 
response to Black faces was a Black-threat association, not a Black-negative association.  
Implications of the DIPM to Prejudice 
I used a priming task and a mouse-tracking task to examine White participants’ 
differential associations of Black, White (Study 4), and Asian (Study 5) with positivity, 
threat, and negativity (Study 4), and neutral (Study 5). Given tendencies for in-group 
favoritism, I expected White individuals to more strongly associate Whites (and perhaps 
Asians) than Blacks with positivity. More interestingly, it might not be the case that 
White prejudice toward Blacks is driven by a diffuse affective “negativity”. Instead, 
Whites may fear Blacks, which may manifest as a specific association between Blacks 
and threat, and not between Black and negativity. White participants had an easier time 
identifying threatening targets after Black faces in a priming paradigm, and more quickly 
moved toward the threat identifier if the face was Black. Also, participants had a harder 
time identifying any Black face if the paired-expression was anger. Taken together, these 
` 
 
87 
 
results imply a specific Black-threat association, and not simply a Black-negative 
association. 
Perhaps even more interesting is the possibility that ingroup perception can yield 
both ingroup favoritism and outgroup favoritism among groups associated with threat or 
aggression. Black participants, for example, show a shooter bias against Blacks (Kahn & 
Davies, 2011), but also evidence ingroup favoritism on other implicit measures (e.g., 
evaluative priming: Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; IAT: Olson, Crawford, & 
Devlin, 2009). Similarly, Middle Eastern participants are more likely to shoot Middle 
Eastern targets wearing traditional Saudi headgear than less traditional baseball hats 
(Schofield et al., 2015). There has been much debate as to whether members of particular 
marginalized groups, despite their low status, evince ingroup favoritism or reflect 
society’s negative views of their group in the form of outgroup favoritism (e.g., Jost, 
Gaucher, & Stern, 2015; Olson et al., 2009). The DIP model offers a possible 
reconciliation of those views by suggesting that members of marginalized groups—
particularly those associated with aggression—might simultaneously show both 
automatic outgroup favoritism (via i1 threat responses to own-group members) and 
automatic ingroup favoritism (via i2 positive responses to own-group members).   
I also see implications for the DIPM in terms of prejudice measurement. 
Specifically, the DIPM’s implications of separate i1 and i2 responses in the domain of 
prejudice provides a framework for future research to uncover the extent to which a given 
measure of prejudice assesses threat-related responses (as I earlier implied the shooter-
bias might; Correll et al., 2002) vs. i2-related evaluative responses (as IAT and priming 
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measures that employ only valence-relevant attribute items might; Fazio & Olson, 2003). 
This leads to the possibility of better prediction of discriminatory behavior (Guglielmi, 
1999). As threat-responses and “mere” approach/avoidance responses likely look 
different behaviorally, the i1/i2 distinction provides a finer-grained analysis of the sorts 
of behaviors different measures of prejudice are likely to predict. For example, a measure 
more attuned to threat responses might better predict fearful emotions and avoidance of 
the target, whereas a measure more attuned to valence might better predict anger or 
disgust and either approach or other information seeking behaviors. 
  Finally, in line with contemporary theories of the functional bases of prejudice 
(e.g., Schaller & Neuberg, 2012; Smith, 1993), the DIPM suggests a functional 
distinction between more physical threat-based and more evaluative-based prejudices 
(perhaps, for example, in terms of violations of traditional values). This speaks directly to 
the distinctions between several theories of prejudice such that Black may be associated 
with bad and not threat (e.g., symbolic racism), associated with threat (e.g., Schaller & 
Neuberg, 2012), and/or associated with bad without specifying a bad/threat distinction 
(e.g., aversive racism). Additionally, this distinction implies that different interventions 
might be developed to address the specific underlying bases of the prejudice based on this 
distinction. For example, contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954) proposes that positive 
outgroup contact can foster positive attitude change (Pettigrew & Wright, 2011; Zhou, 
Page-Gould, Aaron, Moyer, & Hewstone, 2018). In line with exposur therapies aimed at 
reducing phobic responses (discussed below), positive exposure to feared outgroups may 
alter threat responses (a sort of desensitization) but not necessarily affect other negative 
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responses, leaving those prejudices intact. Yet, as discussed below, threat-responses may 
be more difficult to unlearn, suggesting that threat-based prejudices may be more difficult 
to reduce. 
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CHAPTER 54 
GENERAL DISCUSSION, OPEN CONCEPTUAL QUESTIONS, AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER LINES OF RESEARCH 
By distinguishing implicit threat processing and implicit valence processing, the 
DIPM provides a fuller understanding of evaluative processing and offers unique insights 
to various fields of study. The previous section applied the model to prejudice. The 
following sections examine some of those insights to phobia and intimate partner 
violence. I end with a discussion of some open conceptual questions about the model. 
Implications of the DIPM 
Implications for Phobia 
Phobias are the result of a dysfunctional predictive relationship that occurs when 
the level of threat associated with a stimulus becomes catastrophic (Davies, 1997). Some 
treatments appear able to reduce the magnitude of fear responses, often extinguishing 
them entirely (Hermans, Craske, Mineka, & Lovibond, 2005). Yet, a return of fear (e.g., 
renewal, reinstatement, spontaneous recovery) often occurs when the ostensibly 
extinguished fear response suddenly returns. The DIPM suggests that phobia treatments 
appear to target i2 and e, with less influence on i1. In particular, the spontaneous return of 
fear suggests that the phobic target remains associated with threat via i1 despite 
becoming more favorably evaluated via i2 and e (Hermans et al., 2005). The temporary 
reduction of fear responses is likely a highly-controlled process through explicit behavior 
                                                 
4 Much of Chapter 5 was previously published in March, D., Gaertner, L., & Olson M.A. (2018). On the prioritized 
processing of threat in a dual implicit process model of evaluation. Psychological Inquiry, 29, 1-13. 
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modification supported by more favorable i2 and e evaluations that attempt to suppress 
i1’s outputs.  
The regulating ability of i2 and e is suggested by research showing that the more 
favorable peoples’ automatic and explicit evaluations became of the fear inducing 
stimulus (i.e., the effectiveness of treatment), the better was their ability to control 
behavioral manifestations of fear (Huijding & de Jong, 2009; Vasey, Harbaugh, 
Buffington, Jones, & Fazio, 2012). Further emphasizing that what is being affected is the 
regulation of fear, and not the unlearning of the association between the target and threat, 
is research showing that spider phobia treatment had a positive impact on evaluations of 
valence (good/bad), but had no impact on threat (danger/safety) evaluation (Teachman & 
Woody, 2003). Similarly, after undergoing positive training that biases responses to 
emotional situations, participants evaluations of emotional situations became more 
positive, but such training had no impact on their fearful responses to threatening stimuli 
(Teachman & Addison, 2008). In lieu of therapy-induced change to i1’s evaluation, 
reduction of fear response may reflect an increased ability to (at least temporarily) 
regulate fear responses. Return of fear implies that i1 maintains at least some threat 
association to the phobic object even when phobic responses can be successfully 
suppressed.  
This research serves to raise an important issue about whether it is possible to 
unlearn threat associations over extended time. Imagine, for example, a novice snake-
handler with a deadly cobra. On the first few encounters, the novice would likely 
experience a racing heart, sweaty palms, and palpable fear. Over time, however, absent 
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fear-reinforcing events, the practiced snake-handler would likely experience less 
activation of i1. Interestingly, snakes and spiders elicit negative implicit evaluations from 
snake- and spider-neophytes and positive implicit evaluations from snake- and spider-
experts (Ellwart, Rinck, & Becker, 2006; Purkis & Lipp, 2007). Such a positive (i2) 
evaluation (and presumably positive explicit evaluation) might contribute to the 
unlearning of an i1 input over time. Yet, there remains an open question about whether 
any evaluative association can be unlearned (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1964; Petty, Tormala, 
Briñol, & Jarvis, 2006), and it would certainly be a survival benefit for threat associations 
to be particularly inflexible to change. Indeed, recall research showing that conditioned 
angry faces evoke fear responses long after the paired shock is removed, but that happy 
and neutral faces ceased evoking fear responses almost immediately (Dimberg & Öhman, 
1996). This implies that even if it is possible to unlearn an association, those tied to 
survival value may linger much longer.  
The amygdala is vital to conditioned fear (i.e., phobias; LaBar, Gatenby, Gore, 
LeDoux, & Phelps, 1998), meaning that successfully unlearning phobias may involve 
altering the amygdala’s ingrained threat associations. Therefore, phobia treatments aimed 
at making attitudes toward the object more positive (via i2 and e) may only affect i1 
indirectly as a result of changes in i2 and e evaluations. For example, talk therapy 
ostensibly focuses on changing i2 evaluations, while exposure therapy could be though to 
alter i1 responses to a threat. By changing the i1 output (if not the i1 association), people 
may “learn” to effectively control their reactions to phobic stimuli. But importantly, 
changes in i2 and e are not diagnostic of a reduction in the i1 phobic evaluation 
` 
93 
 
evidenced by spontaneous recovery. Phobias may therefore be less susceptible to certain 
types of cognitive therapy (i.e., talk). Phobia treatments that alter the i1 response (i.e., 
exposure) may therefore be more effective changing the long-term outlook.  
Implications for Intimate Partner Violence 
  Victims of intimate partner violence often stay in abusive relationships for 
extended periods, and even after leaving, often return to the abusive partner (Anderson et 
al., 2003; Schutte, Malouff, & Doyle 1988). Victims often convey positive feelings and 
attitudes toward their abuser, frequently even denying the occurrence of abuse, and going 
so far as to defend their abuser (Wallace, 2007). Several theories have been put forth that 
focus on victim characteristics and logistical factors behind stay/leave decisions (e.g., 
Rusbult & Martz, 1995; Strube, 1988). The incongruence of victims’ positive self-
reported attitudes versus the objective negativity of abuse are often explained though 
traumatic bonding theories (i.e., Stockholm Syndrome) as a sort of cognitive dissonance. 
Yet, much is still unknown about the processes that underlie victims stay/leave decisions 
(Bell & Naugle, 2005; Strube, 1988). In addition to the many factors already identified as 
predictors of stay/leave behavior, the DIPM would suggest that victims can hold positive 
i2 evaluations and concurrently associate their abuser with i1 threat. Acts of warmth or 
kindness intermittent with acts of abuse essentially create opposing i1 and i2/e 
evaluations. Decisions to stay may be partially explained by the abuse victim’s strong 
positive i2 and e evaluation, effectively controlling/overcoming their i1 fear of their 
partner.   
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Indirect evidence comes from research showing that amount of self-reported 
emotional attachment, feelings of love, loyalty, and level of commitment toward the 
abusive partner all predict likelihood of remaining in an abusive relationship (Hayes & 
Jeffries, 2013). That is, the level of positive i2 and explicit evaluation toward the abuser 
predicted victim stay/leave behaviors. Interestingly, research has shown that increased 
emotional abuse (ostensibly affecting i2) is more predictive of victim’s decision to leave 
than is increased physical abuse (ostensibly affecting i1; Gortner, Berns, Jacobson, & 
Gottman, 1997). This indicates that perhaps a negative change in i2 or e is the 
determining factor leading to a change in behavior. That is, positive i2 and e evaluations 
allowed the victim to control their i1 fear; but a weakened i2 or e may lessen that control 
and allow an increase in protective leave behaviors. More direct evidence for i1/i2/e roles 
in stay/leave decisions awaits the more precise measurement of implicit constructs called 
for by the DIPM.  
Implications for Suicide 
 Typical models of suicide and suicidal ideation make no formal distinction 
between relatively automatic/implicit vs more controlled/explicit processing (e.g., 
Prinstein, 2008). Yet, dual-process models have shown that incorporating this distinction 
can yield substantial advances in the prediction and explanation of human behavior 
across a variety of domains (Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, 2014). The study of suicide 
and suicidal ideation is ripe for analogous gains in prediction and explanation. 
Specifically, interpersonal theory (Van Orden et al., 2010) has pointed to “acquired 
capability” (i.e., the capacity to engage in suicidal behaviors) as a critical predictor of 
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suicide. From a DIPM perspective, suicidal behaviors would entail overcoming 
seemingly well-ingrained motives to avoid threat. Yet, the DIPM indicates that threat 
processing is particularly efficient and pervasive, occurring prior to other forms of 
automatic processing. Theoretically, many experiences (e.g., combat exposure) could 
influence acquired capability, and are theorized to result in increased pain tolerance and 
decreased fear of death. This could lead to a diminishing of the automatic i1 threat-
avoidance response. This requires overcoming evolved and socially reinforced 
associations between threat and avoidance. From the perspective of dual-process theories, 
this should be difficult and largely impervious to deliberative processing (e.g., Rydell & 
McConnell, 2006). But a DIPM perspective would suggest that long-term, repeated 
“practice” via self-harm or exposure to lethal objects should have more impact on 
acquired capability through gradual changes in threat-avoidance associations. 
The DIPM would predict that suicidal behaviors entail overcoming seemingly 
well-ingrained motives to avoid threat and suggests that experiences involving exposure 
to threat influence an acquired capability to engage in suicidal behaviors. If indeed 
individuals increased pain tolerance and decreased their fear of death dampens i1’s 
reflexive threat response, the DIPM suggest that suicidal ideation response treatments 
may be more effective by targeting and even enhancing the evolved and socially 
reinforced associations between threat and avoidance. Indeed, if people can increase their 
acquired capability through gradual changes in threat-avoidance associations, treatments 
may be able to be developed that do the opposite, which may possibly decrease ones’ 
capacity for suicidal behaviors. 
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Open Questions 
 There remain a number of open conceptual questions regarding the DIPM that 
necessitate further discussion. I examine several such issues in the current section.  
Summation of Successive i1 Events 
 Existing research suggests the possibility that the downstream output of i1 is 
stronger when there are successive i1 events occurring in short duration than when there 
is only a single i1 event. That is, perhaps successive i1 events have a summative effect 
such that preceding i1 activation strengthens subsequent i1 activation (see Figure 5.1). 
Indirect evidence of this summative effect comes from the potentiating effect of ambient 
darkness (vs. ambient light) on both the startle-reflex (Grillon, et al., 1997) and Whites 
participants’ expression of threat-relevant prejudice against Black targets (Schaller, Park, 
& Mueller, 2003). In each instance, ambient darkness can be considered the initial i1 
trigger, which strengthened (relevant to ambient light) the subsequent startle-response to 
an unexpected noise blast (second i1) and activation of threat-relevant (e.g., hostile) but 
not threat-irrelevant (e.g., lazy) stereotype-ratings of Black targets (second i1; assuming 
Blacks are perceived as threatening – see section on “Implication for Prejudice”). Stated 
otherwise, participants experiencing two threats (darkness and noise-blast or images of 
Black persons) evidenced larger threat responses than did participants experiencing a 
single threat response (light and noise-blast or images of Black persons). This suggests 
the summative nature of successive i1 activation.  
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          Figure 5.1. Magnitude of i1 response across time. 
 
 
Dual Implicit Processing in a Simple vs. Complex World 
In their now classic paper, Murphy and Zajonc (1993) demonstrated that both 
angry and smiling faces presented at 4ms yielded valance-consistent affect misattribution 
to a subsequent supraliminally presented neutral stimulus. Some readers might construe 
this finding as being inconsistent with the DIPM: if smiling faces trigger positive affect 
misattribution at only a 4ms exposure, how could there be room for earlier processing of 
a threatening stimulus? In my view, this poses no problem for the DIPM. Murphy and 
Zajonc created a simple world in which participants were presented on any given trial 
with a single stimulus (angry or smiling face) without competition from other stimuli. In 
a complex world involving multiple co-occurring stimuli, the DIPM suggests that 
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threatening stimuli are processed preferentially, and, in the absence of threatening 
stimuli, non-threatening stimuli are processed directly via i2. So, Murphy and Zajonc 
(1984) is quite consistent with the DIPM.  
Is i1 less Susceptible than i2 to Downregulation? 
 There is evidence that explicit goals (e) can affect the activation of implicit 
valence (i2).  For example, Stewart and Payne (2008) demonstrated that an 
implementation intention to activate counter-stereotypic thoughts in response to a Black 
face reduced the automatic activation of prejudice. Thus, e appears capable of 
downregulating i2. However, consistent with my discussion of the phobia research above, 
i1 may be less susceptible to downregulation. The imbalanced connections between the 
amygdala and the cortices (i.e., more afferent than efferent) implies that during the initial 
processing of a threatening stimulus, i1 informs i2 and e more than the reverse. This 
suggests that it might be difficult for any higher order processes (i.e., e) to impact i1. For 
example, explicit knowledge that you are watching a horror movie does not stifle the 
threat response when the axe murderer jumps out of the closet. 
 On the other hand, perhaps i2 and e have some potential to downregulate i1. The 
model posits that when encountering a threat, i1 activates and evokes the cascade of 
outcomes described previously. But i2 and e process the same stimulus, and their 
evaluations might “turn down” the i1 downstream biasing effect on information 
processing despite the continued physiological arousal. Imagine walking through the 
woods and hearing rustling sounds behind you. Initially, i1 evokes behavioral and 
downstream outcomes that direct automatic attention to the rustling. Upon further 
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deliberate inspection, the rustling is realized to be the pattering of a baby rabbit. The 
identification of the rabbit triggers an automatic positive (i2) evaluation. Although your 
heart is still pounding and your palms are sweating, perhaps i1 no longer negatively 
biases information processing. 
Indirect support of such downregulation comes from fMRI evidence of 
differential amygdala activity to Black versus White faces (with the assumption that 
Black faces constitute a threat to many White participants). Although supraliminal 
presentation yielded equivalent fMRI amygdala activation to Black and White faces 
(Cunningham et al., 2004; Hart et al., 2000), (a) amygdala habituation was slower (i.e., 
activity remained heightened longer) to Black than White faces (Hart et al., 2000) and (b) 
subliminal presentation yielded stronger amygdala activation to Black than White faces 
(Cunningham et al., 2004). These results imply that the i1 response to Black faces 
dominated at very short (i.e., subliminal) exposures that granted no opportunity for 
downregulation by i2 or e. But, when images were presented supraliminally, though i1 
evinced a downstream influence (i.e., slower habituation), i2 and e downregulation of i1 
was possible. 
Cunningham et al. (2004) suggest that increased activity in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex (areas implicated in the control of 
regulatory responses) congruent with decreased amygdala activity reflect the suppression 
of automatic amygdala activation when threats are consciously perceived. We 
supplement this interpretation by suggesting these results reflect the modulation of i1 
over the time course of processing. Interpreting these results is limited by the poor 
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temporal resolution of fMRI, which builds a summary image over multiple seconds. 
Were this same experiment able to take millisecond-precise measurements of amygdalar 
activity, it may have revealed that initial activity to Black faces was equal across sub- and 
supra-liminal conditions, and that only over time (i.e., after i2 and explicit processing) 
was amygdala activity dampened. 
Individual Differences in i1 Processing 
LeDoux (2015) argues that fear and anxiety are two manifestations of the same 
phenomena - threat. The only difference is that fear is a reaction to a specific stimulus, 
while anxiety occurs toward something more diffuse. Research is starting to illuminate 
how individual differences may predispose certain people toward both fear and anxiety. 
If so, this may imply that some people have heightened i1 activity. A specific serotonin 
transporter gene polymorphism (5-HTTLPR) has been associated with heightened 
sensitivity and reactivity to threat (Cheon, Livingston, Hong, & Chiao, 2014). People 
with one copy of the short allele display greater amygdala activity toward threatening 
stimuli (Munafo, Brown, & Hariri, 2008) which manifests as heightened anxiety, 
vigilance, and fear conditioning (Canli & Lesch, 2007). Additionally, individuals with 
PTSD show biased attention and quicker reaction to threatening stimuli (Block & 
Liberzon, 2016) 
Indirect evidence that individual differences in i1 responses lead to heightened 
fear-related outcomes comes from research showing that chronic anxiety may facilitate 
threat associations, potentiate experiences of threat, and predispose people to over-
perceive threat. For example, White et al. (2010) showed that high- versus low-anxious 
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individuals have a processing advantage for threatening words on a lexical decision task. 
Pitman and Orr (1986) aversively conditioned high- and low-anxious individuals to angry 
and neutral faces and found that angry faces resisted extinction only among high-anxious 
participants, indicating that anxiety played a role in buffering extinction. Bishop et al. 
(2004) found that among low-anxious participants, amygdala activity was reduced when 
instructed to attend to a house than a simultaneously appearing threatening face, but that 
high-anxious participants showed greater overall amygdala activity and no differences 
when attending to the house versus the threatening face.  
Cheon et al. (2014) proposed that those with an S-allele “may appraise or react to 
cues of outgroup threat differently” such that the 5-HTTLPR “genotype may predispose 
individuals to experience more negative intergroup contact or perceptions of the 
environment, which may ultimately shape intergroup bias” (p.1269).  Perhaps individual 
differences in (amygdala-mediated) i1 activation are likely to predispose certain persons 
to develop specific phobias and experience more chronic anxiety but may also make them 
more likely to endorse certain group stereotype, particularly those associated with threat. 
Conclusion 
I propose that automatic evaluation is made up of (at least) two distinct processes. 
First is an initial implicit processing of whether a stimulus poses a survival threat (i1). 
This process is sensitive to threats engrained from the evolutionary past, such as snakes 
and heights, as well as idiosyncratically learned threats unique to individual experience 
and social history, such as guns and social groups. Second, is a subsequent implicit 
processing (i2) of the full evaluative spectrum (i.e., positive and negative), which reflects 
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extant dual-process models of evaluation. The DIPM’s integration of early threat-
processing into implicit evaluation more fully captures the dynamics that that underlie 
social cognition and lends insight into several psychological research domains.  
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Stimuli from Studies 1-4 
 
Images indicated by “*” were not used in Study 3 or 4.  
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Mouse-Tracking Metrics 
Mouse-tracker provides metrics that provide information about overall speed and 
shape of responses including reaction time (RT), area under the curve (AUC), maximum 
deviation (MD), and maximum deviation time (MD time). All predicted means are 
presented in Table A.1. All raw mouse-tracking response paths are presented in figure 
A.1. Patterns mostly mimic those of lag time with some exceptions (those that differ are 
indicated with an *).  
I submitted each metric to separate 3 (race) x 3 (paired-expression) multi-level 
regressions using PROC MIXED of SAS and Kenwood-Rodgers degrees of freedom. In 
most instances the model would not converge with random race slopes, and never 
converged with random race X paired-expression slopes (models that converged with a 
random race effect are denoted with a #). All models contain a random intercept and 
random slopes for distractor.  
Angry Target Face 
Reaction time#. When viewing angry faces there was a main effect of race, 
F(2,234) = 11.08, p <.0001, a main effect of distractor, F(2,334) = 35.01, p <.0001, and 
no interaction, F(4,466) = 1.23, p = .2971. The race main effect indicates that angry 
Black faces (M = 970ms) led to quicker identification than did White (M = 987ms), 
t(234) = -2.85, p =.0048, or Asian faces (M = 997ms), t(234) = 4.67, p <.0001, and the 
latter two did not differ, t(234) = 1.82, p =.0698. The lack of an interaction indicates that 
reaction times for angry Black than White or Asian faces did not vary as a function of the 
distractor. The distractor main effect indicates that happy distractors (M = 954ms) led to 
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quicker identification of angry faces than did neutral (M = 975ms), t(233) = -2.40, p 
=.0172, or sad distractors (M = 1024ms), t(233) = -8.14, p <.0001, and more quickly to 
neutral than sad distractors, t(233) = -5.72, p <.0001.  
Area under the curve. When viewing angry faces there was a main effect of 
race, F(2,690) = 34.83, p <.0001, a main effect of distractor, F(2,322) = 5.18, p =.0063, 
and no interaction, F(4,690) = .34, p = .8533. The race main effect indicates that angry 
Black faces (M = .944) led to smaller total area of divergence than did White (M = 1.63), 
t(690) = -6.74, p <.0001, or Asian faces (M = 1.19), t(690) = 7.63, p <.0001, and the 
latter two did not differ, t(690) = .90, p =.3687. The lack of an interaction indicates that 
area under the curve for angry Black than White or Asian faces did not vary as a function 
of the distractor. The distractor main effect indicates that happy distractors (M = 1.023) 
led to smaller total area of divergence than did sad distractors (M = 1.184), t(222) = -
3.21, p =.0015. Area under the curve did not differ to happy vs. neutral distractors (M = 
1.093) did not differ, t(222) = -1.39, p =.166*, or neutral vs. sad distractors, t(222) = -
1.81, p =.0711*.  
Maximum deviation. When viewing angry faces there was a main effect of race, 
F(2,688) = 33.01, p <.0001, a main effect of distractor, F(2,221) = 3.91, p =.0214, and no 
interaction, F(4,688) = .25, p = .9126. The race main effect indicates that angry Black 
faces (M = .516) led to smaller deviation from the optimal path than did White (M = 
.593), t(689) = -6.67, p <.0001, or Asian faces (M = .601), t(688) = 7.35, p <.0001, and 
the latter two did not differ, t(689) = .68, p =.4949. The lack of an interaction indicates 
that maximum deviation for angry Black than White or Asian faces did not vary as a 
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function of the distractor. The distractor main effect indicates that happy distractors (M = 
.544) led to smaller deviation from the optimal response path than did sad distractors (M 
= .596), t(221) = -2.80, p =.0056. Maximum deviation did not differ to happy vs. neutral 
distractors (M = .571), t(222) = -1.46, p =.1463,*, or neutral vs. sad distractors, t(221) = -
1.33, p =.1842*.  
Maximum deviation time#. When viewing angry faces there was a main effect of 
race, F(2,233) = 12.51, p <.0001, a main effect of distractor, F(2,233) = 35.09, p <.0001, 
and no interaction, F(4,466) = .62, p = .6511. The race main effect indicates that angry 
Black faces (M = 488ms) led to an earlier time of maximum deviation than did White (M 
= 499ms), t(233) = -3.21, p =.0015, or Asian faces (M = 506ms), t(234) = 4.93, p <.0001, 
and the latter two did not differ, t(233) = 1.72, p =.0873. The lack of an interaction 
indicates that maximum deviation times for angry Black than White or Asian faces did 
not vary as a function of the distractor. The distractor main effect indicates that happy 
distractors (M = 480ms) led to an earlier time of maximum than did neutral (M = 
490ms), t(234) = -1.91, p =.0580*, or sad distractors (M = 523ms), t(233) = -8.02, p 
<.0001, and earlier to neutral than sad distractors, t(233) = -6.10, p <.0001.  
Sad Target Face 
Reaction time. When viewing sad faces, there was no main effect of race, 
F(2,696) = .26, p = .7696,  but was a main effect distractor, F(2,232) = 55.41, p <.0001, 
and an interaction, F(4,696) = 6.61, p < .0001. The distractor main effect indicates that 
happy distractors (M = 936ms) were more quickly identified than were neutral (M = 
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1026ms), t(232) = -9.63, p <.0001 or angry distractors (M = 1014ms), t(230) = 8.29, p 
<.0001, and the latter two did not differ, t(233) = -1.34, p =.182*.  
The interaction indicates that angry distractors led to slower responses when the 
sad face was Black (M = 1027ms) than when it was Asian (M = 1003ms), t(695) = -2.65, 
p =.0083. Angry distractors did not differentially affect the reaction time to sad Black and 
White (M = 1012ms), t(696) = 1.68, p =.0939*, or Asian and White faces, t(696) = -.96, p 
=.3366. Happy distractors led to quicker responses when the sad face was Black (M = 
915ms) than when it was Asian (M = 942ms), t(695) = 2.95, p =.0032, or White (M = 
915ms), t(695) = -3.90, p <.0001, and the latter two did not differ, t(695) = -.94, p 
=.3460. Neutral distractors did not differentially affect the reaction time to identifying sad 
faces as a function of race, t’s < 1.78, p’s > .0747. 
Area under the curve. When viewing sad faces, there was no main effect of race, 
F(2,695) = 1.61, p =.1999, but was a main effect of distractor, F(2,229) = 21.98, p 
<.0001, and an interaction, F(4,695) = 11.50 p <.0001. The distractor main effect 
indicates happy distractors (M = .9273) led to a smaller total area of divergence than did 
angry (M = 1.118), t(229) = 3.41, p =.0008, or neutral distractors (M = 1.298), t(228) = -
6.63, p <.0014, and smaller to angry than neutral distractors, t(229) = -3.22, p =.0014. 
The interaction indicates angry distractors led to a larger total area of deviance 
when the sad face was Black (M = 1.27) than when it was Asian (M = 1.02), t(695) = -
3.99, p <.0001, or White (M = 1.07), t(696) = 3.11, p =.0020, and the latter two did not 
differ, t(696) = -.88, p =.3814. Happy distractors led to a smaller total area of deviance 
when the sad face was Black (M = .741) than when it was Asian (M = .996), t(695) = 
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4.08, p <.0001, or White (M = 1.045), t(695) = -4.87, p <.0001, and the latter two did not 
differ, t(695) = -.79, p =.4290. Neutral distractors led to a smaller area of total deviance 
when the sad face was Black (M = 1.229) than when it was Asian (M = 1.358), t(696) = 
2.05, p =.041*. Neutral distractors did not lead to a differential area under the curve to 
sad Black vs. White (M = 1.308), t(696) = -1.26, p =.2095, or Asian vs. White faces 
t(696) = .79, p =.4277. 
Maximum deviation. When viewing sad faces, there was no main effect of race, 
F(2,694) = 2.22, p =.1089, but was a main effect of distractor, F(2,229) = 23.14, p 
<.0001, and an interaction, F(4,694) = 14.23 p <.0001. The distractor main effect 
indicates that happy distractors (M = .505) led to smaller maximum deviation from the 
optimal path than did angry (M = .584), t(229) = 4.02, p <.0001, or neutral distractors (M 
= .638), t(228) = -6.76, p <.0001. Angry distractors led to smaller maximum deviation 
than did neutral distractors, t(229) = -2.75, p =.0064. 
The interaction indicates that angry distractors led to a larger maximum deviation 
from the optimal path when the sad face was Black (M = .639) than when it was Asian 
(M = .550), t(694) = -4.26, p <.0001, or White (M = .561), t(695) = 3.71, p =.0002, and 
the latter two did not differ, t(695) = -.54, p =.5878. Happy distractors led to smaller 
maximum deviation from the optimal when the sad face was Black (M = .434) than when 
it was Asian (M = .539), t(694) = 5.00, p <.0001, or White (M = .541), t(694) = -5.07, p 
<.0001, and the latter two did not differ, t(695) = -.08, p =.9402. Neutral distractors led to 
smaller maximum deviation from the optimal path when the sad face was Black (M = 
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.608) than when it was Asian (M =.656), t(695) = 2.27, p =.0234* or White (M = .648), 
t(695) = -1.90, p =.0573*, and the latter two did not differ, t(694)= .37, p = .7122. 
Maximum deviation time. When viewing sad faces, there was no main effect of 
race, F(2,696) = 1.06, p =.3483, but was a main effect of paired-expression, F(2,233) = 
51.12, p <.0001, and an interaction, F(4,695) = 11.50 p <.0001. The distractor main effect 
indicates that happy distractors (M = 470ms) led to earlier deviation from the optimal 
path than did angry (M = 515ms), t(233) = 7.78, p <.0001, or neutral distractors (M = 
525ms), t(232) = -9.49, p <.0001, and the latter two did not differ, t(229) = -1.72, p 
=.0875*. 
The interaction indicates that angry distractors led to later deviation from the 
optimal path when the sad face was Black (M = 527ms) than when it was Asian (M = 
504ms), t(696) = -3.59, p =.0004, or White (M = 515ms), t(699) = 1.93, p =.0538, and the 
latter two did not differ, t(697) = -1.65, p =.0994. Happy distractors led to earlier 
deviation from the optimal path when the sad face was Black (M = 459ms) than when it 
was Asian (M = 471ms), t(696) = 1.93, p =.0543, or White (M = 480ms), t(696) = -3.43, 
p =.0006, and the latter two did not differ, t(696) = -1.51, p =.1326. Neutral distractors 
led to later deviation from the optimal path when sad the face was Black (M = 532ms) 
than when it was White (M = 517ms), t(697) = 2.29, p =.0226*. Neutral distractors did 
not differentially affect the maximum deviation time to sad Black vs. Asian (M = 526ms), 
t(697) = -.81, p =.4172, or Asian vs. White faces, t(696) = 1.48, p =.1399. 
Happy Target Face 
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 Reaction time. When viewing happy faces, there was a main effect of distractor, 
F(2,233) = 6.56, p =.0017*, a main effect of race, F(2,698) = 12.49, p <.0001, but no 
interaction, F(2,698) = 1.09 p =.3583*. The race main effect indicates that happy Black 
faces (M = 983ms) led to longer reaction times than did White (M = 955ms), t(698) = 
4.97, p <.0001, or Asian faces (M = 967ms), t(698) =- 2.94, p =.0034, and also longer to 
happy Asian than White faces, t(698) = 2.02, p =.0436*. The lack of an interaction 
indicates that reaction times for happy Black than White or Asian faces did not vary as a 
function of the distractor. The distractor main effect indicates that neutral distractors (M = 
986ms) led to longer reaction times to identify happy faces than did angry (M = 956ms), 
t(233) = 3.48, p =.0006, or sad distractors (M = 963ms), t(234) = -2.94, p =.0034, and the 
latter two did not differ, t(234) = -.88, p =.3807.  
 Area under the curve#. When viewing happy faces, there was no main effect of 
distractor, F(2,225) = .05, p =.9475, but was a main effect of race, F(2,225) = 12.93, p 
<.0001, and an interaction, F(4,461) = 2.83, p =.0242. The race main effect indicates that  
happy Black faces (M = 1.191) led to a larger area of total deviance than did White (M = 
.983), t(225) = 4.85, p <.0001, or Asian faces (M = 1.031), t(226) = -3.74, p =.0002, and 
the latter two did not differ, t(226) = 1.11, p =.2672. 
 The interaction indicates angry distractors led to larger total area of divergence 
when the happy face was Black (M = 1.241) than when it was White (M = .927), t(665) = 
4.64, p <.0001, or Asian (M = 1.011), t(666) = -3.43, p =.0007, and the latter two did not 
differ, t(666) = 1.20, p =.2290. Sad distractors led to a larger total area of divergence 
when the happy face was Black (M = 1.227) than when it was White (M = .993), t(666) = 
` 
143 
 
3.47, p =.0005, or Asian (M = .982), t(666) = -3.64, p =.0003, and the latter two did not 
differ, t(668) = -.16, p =.8711. Neutral distractors did not differentially affect the area 
under the curve to happy faces as a function of race, ts < 1.20, ps > .2304. 
 Maximum deviation#. When viewing happy faces, there was no main effect of 
distractor, F(2,230) = .75, p =.9297, but was a main effect of race, F(2,224) = 22.19, p 
<.0001, and an interaction, F(4,464) = 3.51, p =.0078. The race main effect indicates that 
happy Black faces (M = .606) led to larger deviation from the optimal path than did 
White (M = .512), t(224) = 6.48, p <.0001, or Asian faces (M = .539), t(225) = -4.57, p 
<.0001, and larger deviations to happy Asian than White faces, t(225) = 1.90, p =.0581*. 
 The interaction indicates that angry distractors led to larger deviation from the 
optimal path to when the happy face was Black (M = .631) than when it was White (M = 
.498), t(688) = 5.52, p <.0001, or Asian (M = .535),  t(689) = -3.98, p <.0001, and the 
latter two did not differ, t(689) = 1.53, p =.1274. Sad distractors also led to larger 
deviation from the optimal path when the happy face was Black (M = .619) than when it 
was White (M = .508), t(689) = 4.62, p <.0001, or Asian (M = .519),  t(689) = -4.17, p 
<.0001, and the latter two did not differ, t(691) = .46, p =.6467. Neutral distractors did 
not differentially affect response deviation to happy faces as a function of race, ts < 1.52, 
ps > .1290. 
Maximum deviation time#. When viewing happy faces, there was a main effect 
of distractor, F(2,235) = 5.67, p =.0039*, a main effect of race, F(2,233) = 14.19, p 
<.0001, and an interaction, F(4,465) = 5.48, p =.0003. The distractor main effect 
indicates that neutral distractors (M = 495ms) led to later deviation from the optimal path 
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than did angry (M = 480ms), t(234) = -3.32, p =.0011, or sad distractors (M = 485ms), 
t(235) = 2.16, p =.0225, and the latter two did not differ, t(235) = -1.16, p =.2490. The 
race main effect indicates that happy Black faces (M = 495ms) led to later deviation from 
the optimal path than did White (M = 477ms), t(233) = 5.31, p <.0001, or Asian faces (M 
= 488ms), t(234) = -2.30, p =.0225, and later to happy Asian than White faces, t(234) = 
3.02, p =.0029*. 
The interaction indicates that angry distractors led to a later maximum deviation 
from the optimal path when the happy face was Black (M = 500ms) than when it was 
White (M = 464ms), t(698) = 6.23, p <.0001, or Asian (M = 477ms), t(699) = -4.01, p 
<.0001, and later when it was Asian than White, t(699) = 2.21, p =.0275. Neutral 
distractors led to a later maximum deviation from the optimal path when the happy face 
was Asian (M = 502ms) than when it was White (M = 489ms), t(698) = 2.24, p =.0251*. 
Neutral distractors did not differentially affect the time of maximum deviation to happy 
Black (M = 493ms) vs. Asian, t(699) = 1.51, p =.1325, or Black vs. White faces, t(699) = 
.73, p =.4638. Sad distractors led to later deviation from the optimal path when the happy 
face was Black (M = 493ms) than when it was White (M = 479ms), t(699) = 2.41, p 
=.0163. Sad distractors did not differentially affect the maximum deviation time to happy 
Black vs. Asian (M = 484ms), t(699) = -1.55, p =.1220*, or Asian vs. White faces, t(700) 
= .86, p =.3916 
Neutral Target Face 
Reaction time#. When viewing neutral faces, there was no main effect of race, 
F(2,229) = .36, p =.6979*, but was a main effect of distractor, F(2,233) = 8.36, p <.0001, 
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and an interaction, F(2,461) = 5.80, p <.0001. The distractor main effect indicates that 
sad distractors (M = 1025ms) led to longer reaction times than did angry (M = 992ms), 
t(233) = -3.71, p =.0003, or happy distractors (M = 995ms), t(233) = -3.34, p =.0010, and 
the latter two did not differ, t(233) = -.38, p =.7014.  
The interaction indicates that angry distractors led to slower responses when the 
neutral face was Black (M = 1003ms) than when it was White (M = 981ms),  t(697) = 
2.54, p =.0112. Anger distractors did not differentially affect the reaction time to neutral 
Black vs. Asian (M = 990ms), t(697) = -1.53, p =.1266*, or Asian vs. White faces, t(696) 
= 1.01, p =.3114. Happy distractors led to quicker responses when the neutral face was 
Asian (M = 980ms) than when it was Black (M = 1000ms), t(698) = -2.36, p =.0183*, or 
White (M = 1005ms), t(698) = -2.99, p =.0029*, and the latter two did not differ, t(697) = 
-.63, p =.5306. Sad distractors led to slower responses when the neutral face was Asian 
(M = 1037ms) then when it was Black (M = 1015ms), t(699) = 2.55, p =.0110*, or White 
(M = 1021ms), t(697) = 1.87, p =.0615*, and the latter two did not differ, t(699) = -.67, p 
=.5006*. 
Area under the curve. When viewing neutral faces, there was a main effect of 
race, F(2,698) = 8.15, p =.0003, a main effect of distractor, F(2,233) = 3.38, p =.0356, 
and an interaction, F(4,698) = 6.09 p <.0001. The race main effect indicates that the total 
area of divergence was larger when the neutral face was Black (M = 1.196) than when it 
was Asian (M = 1.083), t(699) = -3.55, p =.0004, or White (M = 1.087), t(698) = 3.44, p 
=.0006, and the latter two did not differ, t(698) = -.12, p =.9074. The distractor main 
effect indicates that sad distractors (M = 1.191) led to larger total area of divergence than 
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did happy (M = 1.073), t(233) = -2.49, p =.0133, or angry distractors (M = 1.102) ), 
t(233) = -1.89, p =.0605, and the latter two did not differ, t(233) = .60, p =.5482.  
The interaction indicates that anger distractors led to a larger total area of 
deviance when the neutral face was Black (M = 1.28) than when it was Asian (M = 1.04), 
t(698) = -4.48, p <.0001, or White (M = .984), t(698) = 5.45, p <.0001, and the latter two 
did not differ, t(698) = .98, p =.3296. Neither sad nor happy distractors lead to 
differential areas under the curve as a function of race, ts < 1.85, ps > .0644. 
Maximum deviation. When viewing neutral faces, there was a main effect of 
distractor, F(2,233) = 3.73, p =.0254, a main effect of race, F(2,698) = 10.75, p <.0001, 
and an interaction, F(4,698) = 7.57, p <.0001. The race main effect indicates that neutral 
Black faces (M = .618) led to larger deviation from the optimal path than did White (M = 
.565), t(698) = 4.15, p <.0001, or Asian faces (M = .568), t(699) = -3.87, p =.0001, and 
the latter two did not differ, t(698) = .28, p =.7832. The distractor main effect indicates 
that sad distractors (M = .607) led to larger total area of divergence than did happy (M = 
.561), t(233) = -2.69, p =.0076, or angry distractors (M = .577), t(233) = -1.74, p =.0832, 
and the latter two did not differ, t(233) = .95, p =.3445.  
 The interaction indicates that angry distractors led to larger deviation from the 
optimal path to when the neutral face was Black (M = .649) than when it was White (M = 
.532), t(698) = 5.94 p <.0001, or Asian (M = .550),  t(689) = -4.98, p <.0001, and the 
latter two did not differ, t(689) = .96, p =.3381. Sad distractors led to larger deviation 
from the optimal path when the neutral face was Black (M = .636) than when it was 
White (M = .582), t(700) = 2.76, p =.0059, or Asian (M = .602), t(700) = -1.72, p =.0861, 
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and the latter two did not differ, t(698) = 1.04, p =.2975. Happy distractors did not 
differentially affect response deviation to happy faces as a function of race, ts < 1.54, ps 
> .1246. 
Maximum deviation time#. When viewing happy faces, there was a main effect 
of distractor, F(2,231) = 10.30, p <.0001, a main effect of race, F(2,231) = 4.53, p 
=.0118, and an interaction, F(4,464) = 5.96, p =.0001. The distractor main effect 
indicates that sad distractors (M = 524ms) led to later maximum deviation from the 
optimal path than did angry (M = 508ms), t(231) = -3.41, p =.0008, or happy distractors 
(M = 504ms), t(231) = -4.30, p <.0001, and the latter two did not differ, t(231) = .88, p 
=.3804. The race main effect indicates that neutral Black faces (M = 517ms) led to later 
maximum deviation from the optimal path than did White (M = 510ms), t(230) = 2.03, p 
=.0438, or Asian faces (M = 508ms), t(231) = -2.94, p =.0036, and the latter two did not 
differ, t(231) = -.91, p =.3627. 
The interaction indicates that angry distractors led to a later maximum deviation 
from the optimal path when the neutral face was Black (M = 520ms) than when it was 
White (M = 500ms), t(694) = 3.67, p =.0003, or Asian (M = 502ms), t(694) = -3.29, p 
=.0011, the latte two did not differ, t(694) = .38, p =.7020. Happy distractors led to a 
earlier maximum deviation from the optimal path when the neutral face was Asian (M = 
494ms) than when it was Black (M = 504ms), t(695) = -1.98*, p =.0479, or White (M = 
513ms), t(695) = -3.60, p =.0003*, and the latter two did not differ, t(694) = -1.63, p 
=.1042. Sad distractors did not differentially affect the time of maximum response 
deviation as a function of race, ts < 1.59, ps > .1131*. 
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Figure A.1 .Raw mouse-tracking paths. Note: All paths have been horizontally re-mapped 
to the left. X-axis: 0 = center of screen, 1 = left edge of screen. Y-axis: 0 = bottom of 
screen, 1.5 = top edge of screen. Asian and White lines often overlap.  
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Table A.1. Mouse-tracking metrics of each Target x Distractor pairing by race of the face 
    Distractor Expression 
Target 
Expression 
 
Metric 
 Angry (Dangerous)  Sad (Depressed)  Happy (Cheerful)  Neutral (Calm) 
 Asian Black White  Asian Black White  Asian Black White  Asian Black White 
Angry 
(Dangerous) 
 
Lag Time      574 516 552  511 483 502  530 496 527 
RT      1045 1006 1022  960 944 959  985 961 979 
AUC      1.27 1.02 1.26  1.10 .88 1.09  1.21 .93 1.36 
MD      .63 .54 .62  .57 .49 .57  .61 .51 .59 
MD Time      535 512 523  485 472 484  500 479 493 
Sad 
(Depressed) 
 
Lag Time  519 573 523      498 467 512  577 558 554 
RT  1003 1024 1012      942 915 951  1025 1035 1019 
AUC  1.02 1.27 1.07      1.00 .74 1.05  1.36 1.23 1.31 
MD  .55 .64 .56      .54 .44 .54  .66 .61 .65 
MD Time  504 527 515      471 459 480  527 532 517 
Happy 
(Cheerful) 
 
Lag Time  490 544 483  500 548 501      532 522 510 
RT  950 976 941  958 982 951      992 992 973 
AUC  1.01 1.24 .93  .98 1.23 .99      1.10 1.11 1.03 
MD  .53 .63 .50  .52 .62 .51      .57 .57 .53 
MD Time  477 500 464  484 493 479      502 493 489 
Neutral 
 (Calm) 
 Lag Time  524 568 516  549 573 530  520 521 535     
 
RT  990 1003 981  1037 1015 1021  980 1000 1005     
AUC  1.04 1.28 .98  1.17 1.25 1.15  1.04 1.05 1.13     
MD  .55 .65 .53  .60 .64 .58  .55 .55 .58     
MD Time  502 520 500  527 526 518  494 504 513     
Note. All values are estimates of least square means. RT = reaction time in milliseconds; AUC = area under the curve; MD = 
maximum deviation; MD Time = time of maximum deviation. 
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Facial Stimuli from Study 5 
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